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The post- Second World War (WW II) period witnessed an increase in nationalist activities, and 
activism in Asia and Africa which resulted in the independence of most the colonies in these 
continents. The declaration of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 which spelt out the right to self-
determination contributed immensely to this activism: the charter stated inter alia that it respects 
the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish 
to see sovereign rights and self -government restored to those who have been 
forcefully deprived of them. Indigenous activists and writers in America after the Second World 
War also encountered ideas about global decolonization and engaged in a process of depicting 
Canada as a colonizing state, a historical narrative that had not been popularly accepted at that 
point…, what was later named ‘Red Power’ was a framework that interrogate the specificity 
settler-colonisation locality and Canadian government policy using globally circulating ideas 
about decolonization and anti-racism. Thus, the activism and nationalism during and after the WW 
II against all forms of colonialism was not only prevalent and ubiquitous in Africa and Asia, but 
also, it was a common phenomenon among the Indigenous people in America and Canada too. 
The WW II created a global political, economic and social conditions in which both the European 
colonial masters, and the colonies in Africa in particular responded to those conditions to promote 
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their interest. United States of America (USA) and Russia also responded to the political situation 
of the world after the WW II which culminated in the Cold War. In effect, the post-WW II created 
global wind of change, and influenced the internal political, economic and social conditions in 
both the colonies and the Western Powers. However, there were varying degrees of radical 
response to the internal conditions of the African colonies under the grip of colonial rule of the 
European powers after the WW II. Ghana was the first black African country south of the Sahara 
to gain political independence. It is therefore imperative to interrogate the combining effects of 
post-WW II political, social, and economic conditions in Ghana, then called Gold Coast, and the 
Ghanaian Nationalist activities on the decolonization drive of Ghana. This essay examines the 
interplay of the Ghanaian Nationalists and the post-WW II internal Conditions in Gold Coast, and 
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1.0 NATIONALISM IN GHANA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
After the Asante Kingdom was defeated in the Sagrenti War in 1874, Britain annexed the 
southern vassal states of Asante and constituted them into a Protectorate while they converted their 
forts and settlements on the coast into the British Crown Colony of the Gold Coast in July 1874.1 
Shortly after the Yaa Asantewaa War, in January 1902, Asante and the Northern territories were 
declared British crown colony and protectorate respectively by the British. In July 1921, the Trust 
Territory of Trana-Volta Togoland was annexed to the Gold Coast by the British. In effect, by 
1921, the present -day Ghana in its present geographical size became a British colony. 
It must be noted that the period of colonial rule in Ghana saw some form of nationalism 
against the British colonial rule before WW II. Nationalism at the period before WW II was geared 
towards the attainment of equity, opportunity, reforms, increase in political participation, and the 
nationalist used non-violent means such as recourse to legal means, diplomacy, constitutional 
means, protest, sending of delegation to the secretary of state of the colonies in Britain.2 The Proto-
nationalism, the nationalism in Ghana before the WW II, also vehemently protested legislations 
that were inimical to the interest of the Ghanaians, discrimination against Africans, and also 
demanded franchise for the indigenes.3 A Classical examples of the Proto-nationalism, nationalism 
before the WW II, are the Aborigines’ Right Protection Society which fought against the land bill 
of 1897, and generally served as the official mouth piece of the people of Gold Coast prior to WW 
II, the National Congress of British West Africa which brought all the British colonies in West 
 
1 Adu Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and the Twentieth Centuries (Accra: Sankofa 
Educational Publishers Ltd., 2000). p 21. 




Africa(Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia) to demands for reforms and increased political 
participation.4 The Gold Coast Youth Conference was also formed to unite and reconcile the 
educated elites to fight for a common cause. Some of the prominent nationalist at this period were 
Joseph Casely Hayford, John Mensah Sabah, J. W Sey, J. P Brown, T. Hutton Mills, Dr. F.V. 
Nanka Bruce, etc. 
The post-Second World War nationalism operated with a different aim, and its modus 
operandi were sharply different from the Proto-nationalism. Nationalism at this period was militant 
and radical. Nationalism changed drastically after World War II, and it was described as radical 
because nationalist activities no longer took the form of protest movements.5 Instead, it was largely 
militant, as nationalist adopted such radical methods as strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, etc. and 
press home their demands for political independence for the people of Gold Coast.6 The WW II 
brought revolutionary changes to Gold Coast, and consequently offered a great stimulus to 
nationalism and the movement towards political independence.  Some of the revolutionary changes 
that WW II brought include the boycott of European goods, formation of political parties which 
demanded an end to colonial rule, the 1948 Riot, and the Positive Action, a mass civil disobedience 
and strike action by workers.  This paper seeks to delve into the nature of the post-WW II 
nationalism in Gold Coast, the pivotal roles played by the actors(nationalists), the conditions 
prevailing in post-WW II Gold Coast which influenced the nationalist activities and the impact 
these nationalist activities had on the decolonization drive of Gold Coast. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first aspect will throw light on the research 
questions, the thesis statement, theoretical framework, the sources for the paper, and the definitions 
 
4 Prince Adjei Kuffour, Concise Notes on African and Ghanaian History (Accra: K4 Series, 2017). p. 518-520. 
5 ibid, p.530.  
6 ibid, p. 530. 
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of key words and terminologies that will be used in this essay. The second section will place the 
thesis in historical context-literature review. The third section will explain the outline of the essay, 
and the final section will provide conclusion for this chapter. 
1.1 Research Questions, Thesis Statement, Sources, and the Definitions of key 
Terminologies/Words. 
This essay seeks to find answers to three major research questions. The first one is, ‘what 
were the major nationalist activities and the actors of those nationalist activities in Ghana after 
1945?’ This essay discusses the organization, the pivotal role played by the actors, and the 
execution of the actual nationalist activities that took place after 1945. The second research 
question this paper seeks to find answers to is, ‘what social, economic, and political factors 
accounted for the nationalists’ activities in Ghana after the Second World War?’ This essay will 
thoroughly examine the post-WW II social, economic, and political conditions and the influence 
they had on nationalism in Ghana. The third research question is ‘how did the nationalist activities 
after the Second World War impact on the decolonization drive in Ghana?’ This question basically 
seeks to find the correlation between the post-WW II nationalism and the attainment of political 
independence in Ghana. 
The essay is firmly premised on the thesis statement that the social, economic and political 
conditions in Gold Coast after the Second World War increased the tempo of nationalism in Gold 
Coast after 1945, and the Second World War acted as a catalyst for the decolonization of Ghana. 
Some of these conditions were repercussions of the WW II, and they included but were not limited 
to acute inflation, unemployment, inadequate housing facilities, the frustrations of the ex-
servicemen due to their deplorable conditions, the broken myth surrounding the perceived 
superiority of the white man, a deficit in educational facilities, lack of Africanisation of the civil 
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service, the dissatisfaction of the colonial government approach to the swollen shoot disease that 
affected the cocoa industry, and the political disaffection created among the educated elites due to 
the weaknesses of the Burns Constitution of 1946. These social, economic, and political conditions 
became the momentum which propelled the nationalists to engaged in radical nationalism. 
Secondly, the essay argues that the 1948 Riot was the turning point of Ghana’s decolonization 
drive that ultimately paved the way for Ghana’s independence. The riot led to the arrest and 
detention of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) leaders which increased their political 
popularity and influence in Gold Coast. Also, the institution of a commission of enquiry into the 
disturbances (the Watson Commission) recommended a new constitution that would grant internal 
self-government for the Gold Coast. Furthermore, the 1948 Riot led to the creation of the Coussey 
Committee which drafted the 1951 Constitution of Gold Coast that paved the way for internal self-
government, which prepared Gold Coast for independence. The exclusion of Kwame Nkrumah 
from the Coussey Committee led to the breaking away of Nkrumah from the UGCC to form the 
Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the party that led Ghana to independence in 1957. 
This essay will explore several primary sources as well as some few secondary sources. 
The primary sources such as reports of commissions of enquiry, letters of correspondence between 
the British colonial officers in Gold Coast and the British government in London, reports of 
parliamentary select committees, autobiographies of some political actors, and official British 
colonial government records on Gold Coast are explored. Other primary documents include the 
1946, 1951, and 1954 constitutions of Ghana, the constitutions of some pre-independent Ghana 
political parties such as UGCC and CPP, newspapers of some political parties, and some memoires 
of some eye witness of some pre-independent nationalist activities of Ghana. The reports of the 
Commission of Enquiry provide official and detailed information on the social, economic, and 
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political prevailing conditions in Ghana from the genesis of the WWII. They therefore provide a 
comprehensive information on issues which propelled the people of Gold Coast to engaged in 
radical nationalism. However, the information they provide are limited to the terms of reference 
for which these commissions of enquiries were set up, and as a result they are bereft of other 
important historical information pertaining to the themes of this essay. The same can be said of 
reports of official government committees. The autobiographies of some of the political actors too 
provide vivid and relevant information on the topic, but they have their own biases because people 
wrote them from their personal perspective and one needs to crosscheck the information they 
provide with other sources, and subject them to a critical analysis to get a credible information for 
a scholarly analysis of the essay. The colonial letters of correspondence, and the colonial 
government official documents give a chronological historical information on nationalism  in the 
post-WW II Ghana, and the rationale behind the actions and inactions of the colonial officials, and 
the British government in the period under review, 1945-1957, however they also have the 
weaknesses of their information being limited to specific themes, and their content discussed the 
issues from the point of view of British colonial interest. 
Furthermore, the pre-independent political parties’ newspapers throw light on the political, 
economic and social atmosphere in Gold Coast, and give reasons why certain actions of Ghanaian 
nationalist were justifiable. The newspapers are also a good source for showing how nationalism 
was presented to the broader Ghanaian population. However, some of the facts the newspapers 
presented in some cases were embellished, distorted, and the discussions suffered 
oversimplifications of the issues, and their contents were geared towards whipping up emotional 
sentiments of Ghanaians at the time to rise and support nationalist’s activities. The rest of the 
sources are secondary sources which comprise articles in reputable journals, and books written by 
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reputable historians. The journals were put through a meticulous scrutiny by the editors and the 
authors made an extensive use of primary sources in addition to other secondary sources. The 
secondary sources give in-depth analysis and interpretations of the post-World War II events which 
provide an essential insight into the nuances of factors that influenced nationalism after 1945 in 
Ghana. The pitfall in these secondary sources is that, they are subject to personal biases in the 
selections of themes, interpretations, and value judgments of the authors. 
This essay will use some key terminologies and words that need contextual elucidation for 
a better appreciation and apprehension of the themes in this essay. The first term worth explaining 
is nationalism. Prof. Hans Kohn defined Nationalism as a state of mind, in which the supreme 
loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state; a deep attachment to one’s native soil, to 
local traditions and to established territorial authority has existed in varying strength throughout 
history.7  For the purpose of this essay, ‘Nationalism’ denotes the struggle of a people with a 
common identity to free themselves from foreign control and exploitation, in order to embark upon 
a programme which would ensure their social- economic and political advancement, and the 
control of their own destiny. ‘Nationalist activities’ in Gold Coast will therefore mean a concerted 
and calculated effort by the people of Gold Coast to achieve the goals of freeing themselves from 
British colonial rule and exploitation, in order to determine their own destiny to ensure the social-
economic and political advancement of the people of Gold Coast. The ‘Nationalists’ were the 
people of Gold Coast who engaged in Nationalism in the period under review, 1945-1957. 
Added to the above, the words ‘Gold Coast’ and ‘Ghana’ would be used interchangeably 
in this essay, for they represent the same people and the same geographical space. Gold Coast was 
 
7 Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: kreiger Publishing Company, 1965). p. 9. 
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the name used throughout the colonial era till it changed officially to Ghana on 6th March 1957, 
when the colonial rule ended. It must be emphasized that the history of Ghana is not divided into 
periods under pre-World War II and post-World War II, it is for the purposes of this essay that the 
radar and focus have been put on the post- WW II (1945) up to 1957. Another term that will be 
commonly used in this essay is ‘the educated elites.’ They represent the few people of Gold Coast 
before the end of colonial rule who had at least obtained a bachelor degree, and most of them were 
professionals such as lawyers, medical doctors, teachers, and civil servants. Most of these people 
were privileged to school in the western world such as Britain, and USA after they completed the 
various mission secondary schools, and some few colonial schools in Gold Coast. They became 
the leading members of nationalist activities in Gold Coast prior to independence. They were also 
called the ‘intelligentsia’. For the purposes of this essay, the ‘educated elites’ and the 
‘intelligentsia’ will be used interchangeably. Another terminology that will permeate this essay is 
‘the ex-servicemen’. ‘The ex-servicemen’ were the Ghanaian soldiers who returned to Ghana after 
they supported Britain and her allies to victory in the WW II. They became very much influential 
in the schemes of affairs of nationalism in Gold Coast and local politics prior to Ghana’s 
independence. 
This essay will use the term ‘decolonisation’ to mean the action of changing the status of 
a group of people living in a specific, and well- defined geopolitical area from the direct political 
control of a more politically powerful nation to a politically autonomous country, recognized by 
the United Nations as a new nation-state. The term ‘racial discrimination’ will be advisedly used 
to mean the deliberate giving of advantage and opportunities to Europeans (British) in the areas of 
job acquisition, promotion, working conditions, and the use of social amenities to the detriment of 
the Africans (the people of Gold Coast) due to a perceived European superiority and a master-
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servant relationship between the British and the Ghanaians at the period prior to Ghana’s 
independence. ‘Africanisation of the civil service’ would be used in this essay to mean the policy 
of employing more Africans in the British colonial administrative machinery (the civil service) 
and promoting the deserving, and qualified ones to top positions just as their European counterpart. 
‘Independence’ would be used in this paper to represent the freedom of a nation state from the 
yoke of colonial rule to manage its own affairs. Finally, political consciousness would be use to 
connote the growing awareness of the people of Gold Coast about governance related issues, and 
the creation of awakening spirit in the people to play an active role to dismantle colonial rule. 
1.2 Historical Context of Post-World War II in Ghana- Literature Review 
There are a number of scholarly works on nationalism in Ghana after the WW II by eminent 
historians and scholars. Such scholarly works span from the account of the nationalist activities, 
the role of the actors, and reasons that accounted for the nationalism. Adu Boahen posits that of 
all the states south of the Sahara, the first to emerge victorious [against colonial rule] on 6 March 
1957 was Ghana. This historic achievement was primarily the work of two political parties that 
emerged in Ghana in the post-Second World War period; these were the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC) and the Convention People's Party (CPP) formed in August 1947 and June 
1949 respectively.8  Adu Boahen is of the view that the independence of Ghana was made possible 
by the formation of political parties. What he failed to appreciate is the decisive roles the WW II 
induced- post social, economic and political conditions, and the 1948 Riot played in Ghana’s 
independence. Additionally, Adu Boahen attributed the broken myth surrounding the European 
superiority after the WW II, the declaration of the Atlantic Charter which espoused self-
 
8   Adu Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and the Twentieth Centuries (Accra: Sankofa 
Educational Publishers Ltd., 2000) p. 25 
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determination, which was later adopted by UN, the introduction of a new system of marketing in 
Ghana which caused a great deal of anger and frustration, the excessive exploitation of the mineral 
resources of Gold Coast without any attempt to industrilise Gold Coast, and the Burns Constitution 
which failed to satisfy the educated elites as the leading factors which accounted for nationalism 
after  WW II.9  Bianco Murillo who extensively wrote about the consumer cultures in the twentieth 
century Ghana attributed the shortage of goods in post WW II Ghana and its resultant rise in 
nationalism to the curtailment of production of goods due to the debilitating effects the WW II on 
the economy of Britain, and the profiteering and extortionate trade practices of the Association of 
West African Merchants (AWAM).10  Although most of the scholars attributed the shortage and 
high cost of consumer goods to the market system that was put in place by the government, they 
tend to gloss over the curtailment of production of goods as a result of the disastrous consequences 
the WW II had on Europe in general, and Britain in particular as pointed out by Bianco. 
Vincent Okyere grouped the factors that accounted for nationalism in Gold Coast after the 
WW II into external and internal factors.11  He cited the proclamation of the Atlantic charter, the 
broken myth surrounding the White’s superiority, the formation of Negro movements, USA and 
USSR stance against colonialism after the WW II, the independence of Asiatic states, and the 
inspiration from the non-aligned group of nations as the external factors that accounted for 
nationalism.12  Okyere argues shortages of goods and price hikes, unemployment, failure to honour 
promises made to the ex-servicemen, the desire to see democratic ideals practised in Ghana were 
responsible for the internally-driven factors which caused nationalism in Ghana.13 Okyere 
 
9   ibid 81-87. 
10   Bianco Murillo, Market Encounters: Consumer Cultures in the Twentieth century Ghana (Athens-Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2017). p 2. 
11 Vincent Okyere, Ghana: A Historical Survey (Accra: Vinojab Publications, 2000). p. 140-143 
12 ibid 
13   ibid, p. 143-144. 
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disagrees with Adu Boahen that excessive exploitation of minerals in Gold Coast was a cause of 
nationalism in Ghana after WW II. Both Okyere and Adu Boahen seems to have concentrated on 
the role of the main actors of nationalism, and the leaders of the political parties, rather than the 
monumental role played by the 1948 Riot in the attainment of political independence in Ghana. 
Rogers Gocking contends that that the poor handling of the swollen shoot disease that affected the 
cocoa industry by the colonial administration, shortage of consumer goods and demand-pull 
inflation, the dominance of retail trade by foreign firms, the discontent of the ex-servicemen, and 
the shortfalls of the Burns Constitution contributed to the post-WW II nationalism in Ghana.14  
Rogers is of the view that the events after the 1948 Riot such as the institution of the commission 
of enquiry which found Nkrumah to have imbrued himself with communist ideologies, Nkrumah’s 
exclusion from the Coussey Committee, the formation of the Committee of Youth Organisation 
without the prior knowledge of the rest of the UGCC leaders, and Nkrumah’s suspension from the 
UGCC led to the formation of Nkrumah’s CPP.15  Rogers is of the opinion that Nkrumah was more 
radical towards the issue of self-government than the rest of the leading nationalist leaders when 
he rejected the proposed 1951 constitution, calling it ‘Trojan gift horse that was bogus and 
fraudulent’, and the subsequent declaration of Positive Action.16  Rogers however failed to 
establish the fact that the 1948 Riot accounted for the breaking away of Nkrumah from the UGCC 
to form the CPP. The events that followed the 1948 Riot are most of the time not connected to riot 
by historians but are treated in isolation. This essay argues to address that lacuna of historians 
glossing over how the riot carved out the path of Ghana’s decolonisation process. 
 
14 Rogers S. Gocking, The History of Ghana (London: Greenwood Press, 2005). p. 81-84.   
15   ibid 90-92. 
16 ibid 93. 
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Frederick Cooper points out that the shortage of consumer goods due to the increase in 
urban population by 55 percent between 1939 and 1947, and price gouging by European 
monopolistic firms resulted in economic hardship which served as a watershed for the post-WW 
II nationalism in Gold Coast.17  Cooper, who seems to view the causes of post- WW II nationalism 
from the economic perspective turned a blind eye to the curtailment of production of consumer 
goods in Europe due to the WW II negative impact on the European economy, but rather, he put 
his lens on population increase in the cities like Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi etc. as the cause of the 
dearth of consumer goods. Cooper even reechoed the colonial officials’ stance on the causes of 
boycotts, riots, and demonstration as due to disorderly masses, unscrupulous demagogues, 
communist influence, and detribalized urban population.18  Glaringly, Cooper underrated the 
pivotal role played by WW II in influencing nationalism. If the period prior to WW II had 
witnessed a number of non-radical nationalism geared towards reforms, but the post- WW II era 
witnessed a radical, and militant nationalism geared towards decolonization of Gold Coast, then 
historians cannot underestimate the momentous role WW II played as a catalyst for nationalism in 
Gold Coast. 
Francis Agbodeka is of the view that the old protest movements of the chiefs and the 
intelligentsia in Gold Coast prior to 1945 was transformed into powerful and dynamic mass 
movements by some external and internal influences after WW II.19  Agbodeka argues that the 
external influences included the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester (1945), which declared 
that self-determination must be achieved at all cost for Africans, the influence of West African 
 
17 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). p. 
49-50. 
18 ibid. 
19      Francis Agbodeka, The Rise of The Nations States: A History of the West African Peoples 1800-1964 (London: 
Thomas Nelson Printers Limited, 1965). p. 133. 
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students Union in Britain, the democratic ideals which were inculcated into the ex-servicemen 
after WW II, and the educated elites demystification of the White superiority to the masses after 
WW II.20  He attributed the internal influences to the failure of the 1946 Burns Constitution to 
confer full responsible self-government on Ghanaians, and the worse of all, the government 
passive attitude about widespread economic grievances over the cutting of diseased cocoa tress, 
the monopoly of foreign firms and the consequent high prices of commodities and the discontent 
of the ex-servicemen.21  The Burns Constitution gave the people of Gold Coast an African 
majority, which was a tremendous improvement over the 1925 Guggisberg constitution, so for the 
people of Gold Coast to protest against, is a clear indication that the WW II created a volatile 
political atmosphere for nationalist activities. Again, Agbodeka seems to have admitted that the 
economic grievances after the WW II was more decisive in fueling nationalistic activities as he 
referred to the economic grievances as the worst among the internal influences so far as the factors 
that precipitated nationalism are concern.22 
D.E.K. Amenumey contends that the fact that Nkrumah was relatively young, radical, and 
was prepared to use non-constitutional and even violent means to achieve self-government, and he 
could not work with the elderly, conservative and legal-minded members of the UGCC.23  
Amenumey, like other eminent historians such as Adu Boahen asserts that the differences in 
approach and attitude resulted in the strained relationship leading to the breaking away of Nkrumah 
from the UGCC to form the CPP.24  The fact that Nkrumah worked with the UGCC leaders 





23 D.E.K. Amanumey, Ghana: A Concise History from the Pre-colonial Times to the Twentieth Century (Accra: Woeli 




with the UGCC leaders makes the stance of Amenumey far-fetched. Amenumey places emphasis 
on the use of the teeming youth by CPP and Nkrumah, and the CPP’s penchant for radicalism and 
militancy gave it a competitive edge over the other political parties.25  Just as the rest of the 
literature on post-WW II nationalism in Gold Coast, Adjei Kuffour cited the formation of political 
parties, the nationwide boycott of European goods spearheaded by Nii Kwabena Bonne III, the 
1948 Riot, and the declaration of the Positive Action as the major nationalist activities.26 
1.3 Outline of the Essay 
This essay is organised into five chapters. Chapter One basically touches on the research 
questions of the essay, the thesis statement, the definitions and the elucidation of key terms, and 
words in the essay. The Chapter One also explains the historical context of nationalism in Ghana 
after 1945, the literature review on post-WW II nationalism in Ghana, and the conclusion 
summarises the chapter. The Chapter Two puts a historical radar on the landmark nationalist 
activities in Ghana after 1945. Notable among them are the formation of political parties such as 
UGCC, CPP, and the National Liberation Movement (NLM), the nationwide boycott of European 
goods, the 1948 Riot, and the declaration of the Nkrumah-led Positive Action. This chapter 
examines the organisation of these activities, the motives behind these nationalist activities, and 
how the colonial government and officials responded to these nationalist activities. Chapter Three 
examines the social, economic and the political conditions after the WW II which influenced 
nationalistic activities. Some of the conditions which influenced nationalism at this period could 
be viewed as external and internal. Some of the factors that would be discussed in this chapter 
include but not limited to acute shortage of consumer goods and inflation, domination of the retail 
 
25 ibid. 
26   Prince Adjei Kuffour, Concise Notes on African and Ghanaian History (Accra: K4 Series, 2017). p. 543- 548. 
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trade by foreign firms, the discontent of the ex-servicemen, racial discrimination, failure of the 
Burns Constitution to satisfy the educated elites. Chapter Four discusses the how the 1948 Riot 
influenced the decolonization drive of Ghana. Areas such as the arrest and detention of the UGCC 
leaders, the Watson Commission, the Coussey Committee and the 1951 Constitution, and the 
breaking away of Nkrumah to form his own party CPP. This chapter examines these sub-topics as 
a by-product of the 1948 Riot and how they carved the road to Ghana’s independence. Chapter 
Five, the Conclusion of this essay will summarises the argument of this essay, and the essay in 
general. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the background of the research and established the purpose of the 
research as the need to find answers to the reasons why nationalism became radical and geared 
towards political independence after the WW II, and the need to examine how the 1948 Riot 
influenced the decolonization drive of Ghana. The chapter also provided the research questions of 
this essay: what were the major nationalist activities and the actors of those nationalist activities 
in Ghana after 1945? what social, economic, and political factors accounted for nationalism in 
Ghana after 1945? How did the nationalist activities after the Second World War impact on the 
decolonization drive in Ghana? The chapter then stated the overarching argument, the thesis 
statement of the essay, the social, economic and political conditions in Gold Coast after the Second 
World War increased the tempo of nationalism in Gold Coast after 1945 and the Second World 
War acted as a catalyst for the decolonization of Ghana; and the 1948 Riot was the turning point 
of Ghana’s decolonization drive that ultimately paved way for Ghana’s independence. The chapter 
also indicated the theoretical frameworks of the essay, threw light on the historical context of 




2.0 LANDMARK OF NATIONALIST EVENTS IN GOLD COAST, 1945-1957: 
ACTIVITIES ACTORS, AND COLONIAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE. 
This chapter examines the major nationalist activities after WW II in Gold Coast. It will 
specifically discuss the organisation of these activities, the main actors, the motives (aims) behind 
these nationalist activities, and how the colonial government and officials responded to these 
nationalist activities. The nationalist activities that are discussed here are the formation of political 
parties, the nationwide boycott of European goods in 1948, the 1948 Riot, and the declaration of 
Positive Action by CPP. 
2.1 Formation of Political Parties 
Before Ghana’s independence on 6th March, 1957, a number of political parties were founded. This 
chapter will however discuss the three most prominent ones which influenced Ghana’s political 
history prior to 1957. These three parties were the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), 
Convention People’s Party (CPP), and the National Liberation Movement (NLM). 
The UGCC. The first known political party that was founded in Ghana was United the Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC). The UGCC absorbed some members of the Aborigine’s Right Protection 
Society, a body which acted as the mouth piece of the people of Gold Coast since 1897, but became 
less effective in the 1940s.27 The Gold Coast Youth Conference, a youth movement founded by 
the Dr. J.B. Danquah, the mainspring of UGCC, was also absorbed into the UGCC.28 The National 
League of Gold Coast formed by Edward Akuffo Addo in 1941 was also absorbed into the 
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UGCC.29 Thus, the UGCC was a merger of the leading educated elites in Gold Coast who realized 
the need to unite to wrestle political independence from the colonial government. The educated 
elites gave up on their personal and pre- WW II dormant nationalist organistions to form the UGCC 
to chart on a new path. The educated elites gave up on the old and dormant political organisations 
because they realized the post-WW II nationalism must be geared towards self- government, and 
not just constitutional reforms which was the primary aim of the pre-WW II nationalist 
organisations. After preliminary meetings attended only by the organisers of the movement, a 
number of public or semi-public meetings were held in Saltpond and Accra during the month of 
July with the principal object of attracting attention to the inaugural meeting which was held at 
Saltpond on the 4th of August 1947.30 UGCC had the initial support base from large coastal towns 
and cities of Accra, Saltpond, Cape Coast, Sekondi and Kibi.31 
It is important to note that the leading members of the UGCC were all members of the 
upper elite of lawyers, intellectuals and big businessmen.32 Foremost among them was George (or 
Pa, as he was affectionately known) Grant, who was elected chairman, and J.B. Danquah, the 
founder of the Youth Conference, who was elected Vice-Chairman, along with R.S. Blay, a 
Sekondi lawyer.33 R.A. Awoonor Williams, another lawyer, was the Treasurer.34 Other leading 
members were E.A. Akufo Addo, J.W de Graft Johnson, Obetsebi Lamptey and Kobina Kessie, 
all of whom were lawyers, E.A. W. Ofori Atta, a graduate teacher, and John Tsiboe, the proprietor 
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of the Ashanti Pioneer.35 Some of these key members were also closely connected with traditional 
rulers. Danquah and Ofori Atta were respectively brother and son of the powerful paramount chief, 
Nana Sir Ofori Atta I, while Akufo Addo was a son-in-law of the same chief.36 Kwame Nkrumah 
was later invited (upon the recommendation of Arko Adjei) to be full -time secretary of the 
UGCC.37 
The first aim of the party, as set out in paragraph 4(i) of the draft constitution, was "to 
ensure that the control and direction of Government shall within the shortest possible time pass 
into the hands of the Natural Rulers and their people."38 The second aim was "to ensure that persons 
elected to represent the people and their natural rulers in the present Legislative Council, or in any 
future Legislative Assembly and Senate, shall be so elected by reason of their competence and not 
otherwise”.39 The aims of the party gave an indication that it wanted an end of colonialism, and an 
immediate end of the chiefs constituting the African majority in the legislative assembly per the 
provisions of the Burns Constitution. In fact, one of the party's immediate aims was to wrest power 
from the chiefs, and in line with this, none of the chiefs was invited in the process of drafting the 
party’s constitution.40 When the chiefs were disturbed and alarmed by the activities of UGCC, the 
leadership of the party later appealed to the chiefs to withdraw their membership from the 
legislative assembly in favour of educated non-chiefs.41 Furthermore, in paragraph 4(8) of the draft 
constitution, one of the aims of the Convention was to seek collaboration with other Gold Coast 
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political institutions and parties and "with similar movements in West Africa for any purpose 
common to the peoples of West Africa."42 The leadership of UGCC had a motive to set in motion 
a decolonization drive that will not be only relevant in Gold Coast, but the whole of West Africa. 
It was not surprising they appointed Kwame Nkrumah, who from 1945 to 1947 was actively 
involved in Pan-African Conference and West African Congress activities in London.43 
The organization of UGCC was made effective upon the appointment of Nkrumah as the 
full- time secretary. The party had 13 branches before Nkrumah was appointed, but through the 
instrumentality of Nkrumah, an additional 500 branches were opened in southern Ghana alone, 
and numerous branches were established all over Gold Coast.44 UGCC at this stage had a national 
outlook in its structure, organization and membership. Party cards were issued, dues were collected 
and in a short while as Nkrumah asserted in his Autobiography, funds were raised for the effective 
running of the party, and in addition, an official bank account was opened for the party.45 The party 
held rallies in Accra, and other parts of the colony. The biggest one was on 20th February 1948 in 
the Palladium, Accra.46 The leadership of UGCC capitalized on the 1948 Riot to telegraph the 
secretary of state of the colonies on 29th February 1948 and demanded inter alia a change of 
colonial government;  and the installation of a new government to be headed by the UGCC leaders  
and the chiefs of Gold  Coast.47 The politically astute working committee members of UGCC 
exploited the turbulent political atmosphere in Ghana after the riot to their advantage. They created 
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the impression that the chaotic political atmosphere in Gold Coast was as a result of the ineptitude 
of the colonial administration, and the need for the UGCC to form a government to maintain law 
and order was a necessity. With the exception of Nkrumah, the rest of the five working committee 
members were part of the 23 members of the Coussey Committee nominated by the colonial 
governor that drafted the 1951 Constitution.48 Thus the UGCC members influenced the drafting of 
the 1951 constitution to a very large extent. The last nationalist activity that the UGCC took part 
in before its natural death was the participation in the 1951 election. Out of the 38 contested seats, 
the UGCC won only three.49 
The colonial government responded and reacted to the formation and activities in many 
ways. In a letter from the colonial office to Arthur Creech Jones, the secretary of state for the 
colonies, in December 1947, the colonial government described the working committee of UGCC 
as discredited politicians.50 Even before the arrival of Nkrumah in Gold Coast and his subsequent 
appointment as the full-time general secretary of the UGCC, the colonial office saw him as a 
communist who would use the UGCC as a channel of communist infiltration.51 The colonial 
government was apprehensive about the possible consolidation of the nascent UGCC in the colony 
and suggested some factors that are likely to make the UGCC to blossom: 
Some of the political conditions that might help to foster the strength of the new party 
would be (a) the continued inactivity of the other two parties, the Aborigines Rights 
Protection Society and the Gold Coast Youth Conference; (b) any failure by the central 
Government and local Government bodies to absorb into public service the political 
energies and enthusiasms of the young students who are now beginning to return in 
appreciable numbers from the United Kingdom and elsewhere; (c) any reluctance by the 
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chiefs to extend the membership of their Councils so that they became more widely 
representative of the whole community.52 
After the 1948 Riot, the colonial government accused the UGCC leadership for successfully 
disrupting normal government administration, and fostering an anti-racial atmosphere.53 It was 
obvious that in the political calculations of the government, the riot was instigated by the UGCC 
leaders, and the continues free movement of the working committee would aggravate the situation 
and make the colony ungovernable. The government as a result, arrested and detained Dr. J.B. 
Danquah, Arko Adjei, William Ofori Atta, Edward Akuffo Addo, Kwame Nkrumah, and Obetsebi 
Lamptey; they were only released when the Watson Commission was constituted to probe into the 
causes of the riot.54 Interestingly, the Watson Commission report found out the leaders of UGCC 
were active in exploiting the riot, but had no evidence to prove that they actually promoted and 
instigated the riot.55 The reaction of the colonial government to the formation of UGCC smacks of 
apprehension and paranoid. 
2.2 The Convention People’s Party (CPP) 
On the 12th of June, 1949, the Committee for Youth Organisation (CYO), a wing of the 
UGCC founded by Nkrumah, was metamorphosed into CPP.56 It was launched on the same day 
before an audience of sixty thousand people in Accra.57 This was followed by several attempts by 
some men of God and chiefs to amicably resolved the impasse between Nkrumah and the working 
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committee of UGCC, but ultimately it proved futile and Nkrumah had to resign from the UGCC.58 
CPP carried an intensive campaign throughout the length and breadth of the country and soon, 
with the tireless enthusiasm of young people, the sway of CPP was felt in every nook and cranny 
in Gold Coast. The competitive edge the CPP had over the UGCC was that it was able to attract 
the masses, including women, and the youth while the UGCC was dominated by professionals 
such as lawyers, teachers, and businessmen. The first Central Committee of the Party was 
composed of eight members: Kwame Nkrumah (chairman) Kojo Botsio (secretary), K. A. 
Gbedemah, N. A. Welbeck, Kwesi Plange, Kofi Baako, Krobo Edusei and two others Dzenkle 
Dzewu and Ashie Ikoe who later defected from CPP.59 
One unique feature of CPP which worked very well was the use of the print media for 
propaganda and education: Accra Evening News, the Sekondi Morning Telegraph and the Cape 
Coast Daily Mail did yeoman service in broadcasting the propaganda of the Party and in keeping 
alive the spirit of nationalism.60 The colonial office acknowledged the organisational abilities of 
CPP in the conduct of the 1951 election in a letter to the office of the secretary of state of the 
colonies saying, “C.P.P.'s organisation eclipsed anything that any other Party or candidate could 
offer.”61 The CPP national wide rallies and publications in their newspapers was characterized by 
anti-imperialist speeches, and in most cases, Nkrumah successfully convinced the masses that the 
only panacea to the economic and social predicaments of Gold Coast was self- government.62 The 
CPP thus created the needed political awareness among Ghanaians for the need to end colonialism 
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in order to have a hopeful future. The CPP participated in the three major elections leading to the 
independence of Ghana. In the 1951 February election, CPP won 34 out of the 38 contested seats.63 
In the 1954 general elections held on 15th June, CPP won 79 out of 104 seats, and in the 1956 
general elections which was held on 12th and 17th July, the CPP won 71 seats out of the 104 seats.64 
The personality of Nkrumah, the organizational abilities of the CPP, and the party structures 
appealed to the electorates more than the rest of the political parties. 
The motto of the CPP was ‘forward ever, backwards never’.65 The aims of the CPP were  
(i) to fight relentlessly to achieve and maintain independence for the people of Gold Coast and 
their chiefs now; (ii) to serve as the vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing all forms 
of oppression and for the establishment of a democratic government; (iii) to secure and maintain 
the complete unity of the people of the Colony, Ashanti, Northern Territories and Trans-
Volta/Togoland regions; (IV) to work with and in the interest of the Trade Union Movement, and 
other kindred organizations, in joint political or other action in harmony with the constitution and 
Standing Orders of the Party; and (v) to work for a speedy reconstruction of a better Gold Coast 
in which the people and their Chiefs shall have the right to live and govern themselves as free 
people.66 Nkrumah being a smart politician packaged the CPP to look more attractive than his 
former party UGCC. For instance, the CPP used the slogan ‘independence now’ as against self-
government within the shortest possible time used by the UGCC. Again, Nkrumah connected the 
CPP to the labour unions and the trade union movements. This gave the CPP a strong support base 
among the workers and the teeming youth. 
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The activities of CPP brought it on a collision course with the colonial government. On 
15th December, 1949,  Nkrumah published on the front page of The Evening News a stirring article 
headed  ‘The Era of Positive Action Draws Nigh’.67 The government took the offensive by 
instituting a series of prosecutions against the editors of the newspapers of the CPP, and several of 
the editors were sent to jail.68 Nkrumah was also sent to court to defend a case of contempt which 
had been filed against him as a result of an article which appeared in the Sekondi Morning 
Telegraph, and a fine of three hundred pounds or four months' imprisonment was imposed on 
him.69 Nkrumah downplayed the violations of established laws and regulations, but rather placed 
much emphasis on the way such trials attracted the teeming supporters to the courts which in the 
long run increased his political fortunes.70 The rational choice theory was displayed at its best at 
this juncture. These cases of the colonial government taking the CPP newspaper editors, and 
Nkrumah to court increased the CPP’s image, as the masses saw the party as more radical and 
ready to do anything to win independence for Gold Coast. When the CPP won a majority the seats 
in the 1951 elections, the CPP had a dyarchy with the colonial government, and Nkrumah was 
given the title ‘leader of government business.’71 
2.3 The National Liberation Movement (NLM) 
The NLM was formed in Kumasi on September 19, 1954 by Baffour Osei Akoto, the chief 
linguist to the Asantehene, with the active support of traditional rulers in Asante and Akyem 
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Abuakwa, cocoa farmers and some disappointed CPP members.72 One of the things that inspired 
the formation of the NLM was the need to safeguard the position of chiefs in the constitution of 
independent Ghana.73  The second reason concerns an Upper House, where the Chiefs could be 
represented and which might reflect Regional opinion and possibly include business interests.74 
The NLM expressed an Asante nationalism which was meant to safeguard Asante interest, and it 
was clearly manifested in their drive to protect chieftaincy in the constitution of independent 
Ghana. The colonial office described the constitutional tussle after the 1954 elections as a 
constitutional dispute between the Asantehene, backed by the NLM, and the Prime Minister, 
supported by the CPP.75 Asante has revered their chiefs before, and even during the colonial rule. 
They seemed not to trust Kwame Nkrumah in post- independent Ghana to safeguard the interest 
of the Asantehene in particular and traditional authorities in general, hence the NLM with support 
of the Asantehene demanded a federal constitution. The Asantehene, Nana Sir Osei Tutu 
Agyemang Prempeh II even described Dr. Nkrumah as a ‘madman and once he had secured power 
in an independent Gold Coast a number of his more eminent opponents in Ashanti would have 
their throats cut.’76 On the other hand, Nkrumah described the NLM as ‘a movement on the part 
of Asanteman council and those of Asante people who supported them to free themselves from the 
influence of democracy as represented by CPP’.77 Thus, in the view of Nkrumah, NLM was a 
product of Asante’s aversion for democracy. 
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Furthermore, Nkrumah incurred the wrath of Ashanti when it was known that he proposed 
to call the new central hospital in Kumasi after himself, a proposal that gave great offence and was 
later dropped.78 This could not have incurred the displeasure of the Ashantis if they had been 
content with CPP activities in Ashanti. The Asante were roused as a nation by the general feeling 
that they were being cheated by the CPP government. The feeling reached its height in 1953 when 
the Van Lare Commission, which reviewed the seats to be allocated to each region in the 
impending elections, increased the seats of the North from nineteen to twenty-six, that of the 
Colony from thirty-seven to forty-four, that of trans-Volta from eight to thirteen but that of Asante 
from nineteen to only twenty-one.79 The whole Asante region, including the CPP and opposition 
leaders in the Legislative Assembly, protested this vehemently prior to the 1954 elections but to 
no avail.80 Some of the Asante youth of the CPP were disturbed by growing dictatorial tendencies 
and the centralisation of power in the CPP.81  Their fears grew when the CPP national headquarters 
imposed candidates on the constituencies and then went on to expel eighty-one of those who 
refused to toe the party line, most of them Asante.82 These reasons made a larger section of Asante 
developed revulsion for the CPP; hence the formation of NLM. 
The last motivation that made the Asante, and later supported the Akyem Abuakwa rally 
to form the NLM, was cocoa politics. The NLM was aimed primarily against the CPP government, 
it was inspired partly by the fixing of the price of cocoa at the same price of as last year [1954].83 
 
78 CO 554/1162, no 9 22 Dec 1954 'Gold Coast review of events: July-Dec 1954': despatch no 20 from Sir C Arden      
Clarke to Mr. Lennox-Boyd. Source: BDEEP, Series B Volume I, Part II, p. 107. 
79  A. Adu Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and the Twentieth Centuries (Accra: Sankofa 




83   CO 554/1162, no 9 22 Dec 1954 'Gold Coast review of events: July-Dec 1954': despatch no 20 from Sir C Arden               
Clarke to Mr. Lennox-Boyd. Source: BDEEP, Series B Volume I, Part II, p. 107. 
26 
 
The colonial office of Gold Coast which seems to tacitly buttress this decision described it as 
‘courageous’, and justified it on the grounds that it kept down inflation, and raised the needed 
revenue for government ambitious development programme.84 Nkrumah also justified the 10th 
August, 1954, Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill which fixed the price paid 
to the cocoa farmers at seventy-two shillings a load (sixty pow1ds) for four years as the surest 
means to raise revenue for the much- needed developmental projects for the mutual benefits of the 
people of Gold Coast.85 What seems to have infuriated the people in the cocoa growing areas was 
that during the 1954 electioneering campaign, many of the CPP propaganda agents had promised 
the electorate and farmers that the government would increase the price of cocoa to £5 a load and 
that the new £5 currency note had been introduced to facilitate that payment.86 When the Nkrumah-
led government finally pegged the price per a load of cocoa at £3.12s, it was interpreted as a 
deliberate means to use incomes of cocoa growing areas, and resources in Asante to develop 
southern Ghana, where they had no cocoa. 
The NLM demanded the following: fresh elections in spite of the 1954 elections; higher 
prices for cocoa; a bi-cameral legislature with the upper house made up of traditional rulers; a 
federation of the colony, Ashanti, Northern Territories, and Togoland; a new constitution; and a 
council of state.87 Baffour Osei Akoto was the leader, Kusi Ampofo, general secretary, and E.Y. 
Baffoe, the national propaganda secretary.88 The motto was Amanyopa-Good Governance, and it 
attracted some former CPP faithful’s in Asante like J.E. Appiah, R.R. Amponsah, and Victor 
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Owusu.89 It held rallies, and it grouped a number of ancillary organisations in an attempt to rival 
those of the CPP: the Asante Farmers’ Union, a new Congress of Free Trade Union, a paramilitary 
organization of ‘Action Groupers’ and a fanatic women’s section led by tough Asante market 
traders.90 In the mid-September 1955, NLM produced its own newspaper, The Liberator which 
was hard-hitting and abusive in its publications.91 The supporters of the NLM engaged in brutal 
violence with the CPP opponents in Kumasi, resulting in arson, physical deformities of victims, 
and death on both sides.92 The NLM and her allies finally presented a draft proposal for a federal 
constitution in August 1955, signed by Baffour Osei Akoto, S.D. Dombo, W.E.G. Sekyi, J.B. 
Danquah, and S.G. Antor.93 
The office of the secretary of state, upon several considerations, appointed Sir Frederick 
Bourne, a constitutional expert to settle the constitutional conundrum in Gold Coast.94 The Bourne 
Commission completed its work on 17 December, 1955 with a recommendation that rejected 
federation as demanded by the NLM.95 However, the colonial office succumbed to the NLM call 
for fresh elections, and consequently,  fresh elections were held in July 1956.96 NLM managed to 
win only 12 seats out of the 104 seats.97 The NLM did not have a national outlook in terms of its 
organization, and as a result could not appeal to people outside Asante region. It was a re-
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enactment of Asante nationalism manifesting in a political movement, and as a result, it was only 
influential in Asante. 
2.4 The Nationwide Anti-Inflation Boycott of Foreign Goods in 1948 
Nii Kwabena Bonne III, a chief of Osu Alata, a suburb of Accra successfully organised a 
nationwide boycott of European goods. The purpose of the campaign was to muster all possible 
support in the colony (Gold Coast) for an anti-inflation campaign, and to declare a boycott of 
European goods.98 It must be emphasized that the Nii Kwabena Bonne III’s intent and purpose for 
the organization of the boycott had no political consideration. The Watson Commission Report on 
the 1948 Disturbances findings have it that he was honestly anxious in the anti-inflation campaign 
which he instituted, to bring about a reduction in the prices of essential commodities in short supply 
for the public good.99 Again, the colonial office observed that he did not succumb to the pressure 
of the active members of the UGCC to secure the continuance of the boycott to champion the 
political ambitions of the UGCC when the boycott was called off.100 Some of the boycott  
committee members in other parts of the colony hoped to achieve a complete liberation of Gold 
Coast from economic serfdom.101 
Nii Kwabena Bonne III collaborated with the traditional authorities in the organization of 
the boycott. He launched the anti-inflation campaign in Accra, in October 1947, with the Ga Native 
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Authority.102 He went on to seek the blessings and support of the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs 
on 20th December, 1947 in a meeting at Dodowa, and they gave him their approval with a vote of 
sixty-three.103 Furthermore, the Asante Confederacy council of chiefs spearheaded by the 
Asantehene offered their support to the campaign when Nii Kwabena Bonne III got in touch with 
them.104 The Asante Confederacy council even formed a committee to pursue the campaign and 
the boycott in the whole of Asante.105 The success story of the boycott was partly due to the 
unflinching support the traditional authorities gave to the justifiable cause. The support of the 
chiefs also helped to convince their subjects to fully partake in the campaign and the boycott. 
An Anti-inflation Committee was formed and chaired by Nii Kwabena Bonne III to devise ways 
and means of combating the incredible high cost of imported goods, and to tour the various state 
of the colony too seek the active cooperation of all and sundry.106 The committee wrote a letter to 
the Accra Chambers of Commerce on 29th December, 1947 informing the chamber of the mandate 
given to the committee by the traditional authorities to boycott imported goods if prices were not 
reduced by 24th January, 1948.107 The day for the commencement of the boycott was scheduled on 
Monday, 26th January which was duly enforced all over the colony. The campaign demanded the 
abolition of the import licenses to allow people to import freely from any part of the world 
especially USA.108 Kwabena Bonne spent his own hard-earned money of £1000 in the organization 
of the boycott.109 The Native Authorities enforced the boycott by imposing fines on those who 
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repudiated the boycott, and in some cases, offenders were intimidated, a situation the Watson 
Commission Report described as illegal.110 
Some of the European firms showed uncompromising attitudes. They mocked the boycott, 
and used despicable attempts like provocation, corruption, and physical intimidation for the 
purpose of defeating the boycott, but their attitude united the people and contributed to the success 
of the boycott.111 Kwabena Bonne the organizer of the boycott was offered £10 000 as hush money, 
but he spurned it to keep the boycott alive.112 This was a clear indication that the foreign firms 
would have continued to sell goods at extortionate price of 75 percent profit margin had it not been 
the timely intervention of Kwabena Bonne. The colonial government’s first reaction to the boycott 
was that it was purely a trade dispute in which the government as such must remain neutral.113 
This also shows the colonial government was not much concerned about the economic hardships 
of the people. The colonial government only intervened when the boycott brought trade to a virtual 
standstill.114 
On 20th and 21st February, 1948, the government intervened. Mr. F. Leach, the colonial secretary 
held a meeting in his office together with the representatives of the chiefs, the chamber of 
commerce, the boycott committee, and the government.115 After several deliberations and 
negotiations, a compromised percentage of 50 percent was reached from the exploitative 75 
percent profit margins of the foreign firms, especially on textiles, which was to be on trial for three 
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months.116 The boycott was subsequently called off on 28th February 1948.117 The boycott 
succeeded to abolish conditional sales, dissolution of AWAM, and the elimination of black market 
and profiteering on goods like kerosene, sugar and milk.118 Most importantly, the boycott 
disabused the minds of the foreign trade community and the colonial government that the 
indigenous people of Gold Coast by reason of tribalization and mutual distrust, are unsuccessful 
to combine effectively for any single purpose.119 
2.5 The 1948 Riot 
Events and activities in Accra before 28th February 1948 created a volatile and an enabling 
environment for any slight provocation to spark off disturbances. On the 17th February there had 
been disturbances in Accra, arising out of the prosecution on a criminal charge of the Asere 
Mantse, a chief in one of the suburbs of Accra.120The police were on that occasion heavily 
preoccupied with crowds in the vicinity of the Law Courts so that unruly mobs were able to do 
much damage to property in the business centre of the town before they could be brought under 
control.121 A nationwide ant-inflation boycott of European goods was also in operation to ensure 
a downward adjustment of prices, so as to reduce the cost of living.122 On the 20th February a 
meeting was held by the Ex-Servicemen's Union, a minority organisation which was not affiliated 
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with the Gold Coast Legion, and it was agreed that a petition would be presented to the colonial 
governor concerning their grievances.123 
On the 25th February, the Commissioner of Police saw Mr. Tamakloe, the General 
Secretary of the Ex-Servicemen's Union and, in explaining to him the constitutional channels for 
the presentation of petitions to the Governor, made it clear that the march on Government House 
would not be permitted. Mr. Tamakloe accepted the Commissioner's advice as to the method of 
presenting the petition and asked for permission to hold a parade of ex-servicemen on the 28th 
February, to proceed in an orderly fashion along a clearly defined route.124 The Commissioner of 
Police issued the necessary permit for a parade along the route in question.125 However, the 
procession of ex-servicemen arranged to take place at Accra on 28th February, 1948, rapidly 
deviated from the prescribed route, and those organising the procession took no steps to inform 
the assembly of the prescribed route and made no real attempts to prevent the deviation.126 The 
organisers seem to have done that deliberately to have a confrontation with the colonial security 
in order to give the march a serious attention. The Watson Commission Report concluded that the 
procession was accompanied by a large body of evilly disposed persons organised in a loose way 
for the purpose of spreading false rumours urging the procession forward and making certain that 
it did not turn aside from its objective, namely, Christiansborg Castle.127 I am of the opinion that 
the people who marched together with ex-servicemen were not evilly disposed as the commission 
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report described them, but they were people who were frustrated by the economic hardships and 
hopelessness, and saw the removal of the colonial regime as the panacea to their predicaments. 
After stones had been thrown by the mob - for the parade had by then lost its identity as a 
procession, and two police officers had received head wounds, the order to fire was given by Major 
Imray.128 Shots were fired and one man was killed and one wounded, and the mob was then forced 
back.129 Shortly before any shot was fired at Christiansborg, violence had begun in the town; large 
crowds gathered and began an apparently indiscriminate attack on stores; their object seemed to 
be principally to loot but there was a savage attack on a European Government officer and some 
damage was done to the cars of Europeans.130 The crowds grew rapidly and looting was intensified 
until it became evident that the police unaided could not even contain them in that part of the town 
in which the concentration was greatest, let alone control them within that area.131 The situation in 
Accra on the 1st March was still uneasy in the morning but was brought under control during the 
day.132 The situation elsewhere began to deteriorate, however: there were demonstrations at 
Kumasi and Koforidua and some looting in Nsawam; Ex-servicemen from Accra moved into 
Koforidua and parties also appeared in Kibi and Suhum; Ex-Servicemen also demonstrated in 
Sekondi, they appeared to obtain directions from Accra.133 The spread of the riot to other parts of 
the colony was a clear indication that the people of Gold Coast were disillusioned by the economic 
and political conditions after the WW II. 
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The riot resulted in the death of 29 people while 237 others sustained varying degrees of 
injuries, and property damage was estimated to be £2 million.134 The colonial regime accused the 
UGCC of communist infiltration and instigating the people to engage in the riot for their political 
interest.135 However, the commission which was set up to probe the causes of the riot exonerated 
the UGCC from accusations of instigating the people to engaged in the riot.136 The Commission 
only acknowledged that the UGCC made political gains of the situation.137 
2.6 The Nkrumah-led Positive Action 
The ‘Positive Action’ was one of the most important nationalist activities that took place 
in Gold Coast after 1945. Although it was a CPP-driven activity, this essay deemed it imperative 
to discuss it as a separate entity and not under the CPP as a political party. Nkrumah had the 
conviction that although the British Government and the British people (with the die-hard 
imperialists) acknowledged the legitimacy of Ghanaians’ demand for self-government, it was only 
by their own exertions that they would succeed.138  Nkrumah explained Positive Action as: 
the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack force of 
imperialism in the country. The weapons were legitimate political agitation, newspaper and 
educational campaigns and, as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, 
boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute nonviolence, as used by 
Gandhi in India.139 
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Nkrumah printed about 5000 copies of a pamphlet he titled What I mean by Positive Action, in 
which he explained exactly what constituted positive action, and these pamphlets were distributed 
to the party members to help spread the message of positive action.140 
The first reason given by the Nkrumah for the need for Positive Action was the fact that 
the Coussey Constitutional Committee had given abundant evidence by their dilatory and delaying 
tactics that the people of Gold Coast cannot completely rely on them to produce the Constitution 
the people of this country.141 Secondly, Nkrumah described the Coussey Committee report as 
unsatisfactory as a step towards constitutional reforms.142 He called together the Ghana People's 
Representative Assembly on 20th November. This mammoth gathering was the first of its kind 
and was attended by representatives from over fifty organisations.143 The Assembly resolved ' that 
the Coussey report and His Majesty's Government's statement thereto are unacceptable to the 
country as a whole  and declared  that the people of the Gold Coast be granted immediate self-
government, that is, full Dominion status within the Commonwealth of Nations based on the 
Statute of Westminster.144 After a number of fruitless meetings with Mr. R.H. Saloway, the 
colonial secretary, Nkrumah on the 8th of January declared Positive Action in Accra, and 
proceeded to Cape Coast, Secondi, and Tarkwa, in the mining areas to do same.145 Apart from the 
hospital workers, those employed on water conservancy and other public utilities, and the police, 
a general strike should begin from midnight. It was clear Nkrumah wanted to render government 
services practically impotent in order to coerce government to succumb to his demands. 
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The colonial government responded quickly to the situation which averted a possible 
replication of another 1948 disturbances. The government declared a state of emergency 
throughout the country on the 11th of January, and a strict curfew on 17th January in the main 
towns which kept the towns quiet in the night.146 Even before that action was taken, the colonial 
government observed that the strike was not general and even in Accra, Takoradi, and Kumasi, 
only a small proportion of organised labour obeyed it.147 Nkrumah seems to have confirmed this. 
He realized upon return from the Western Region to Accra on 11th January that the strike action 
needed more aggression so he addressed another mammoth crowd in the Arena to give the strike 
a new life wire148. The Evening News, the Cape Coast the Daily Mail and the Sekondi Morning 
Telegraph had their offices ransacked, and closed by the police and they were all banned; their 
editors were arrested and charged for sedition, and that of Daily Mail, Kofi Baako jailed for 
contempt of court.149 Most of the prominent members of the CPP were arrested including Kojo 
Botsio and Nkrumah. Nkrumah was arraigned before court where he was charged with inciting 
others to take part in an illegal strike under the terms of Positive Action and sedition in Accra, and 
Cape Coast respectively.150 In all, Nkrumah was given three years jail sentence. These politically 
expedient actions of the government ended the Positive Action and restored law and order. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the four major nationalist events that occurred in Gold Coast after 
WW II, namely the formation of political parties, the Anti-inflation nationwide boycott of 
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European goods, the 1948 Riot, and the Nkrumah-led Positive Action. It examined the 
organization, the motives that propelled Ghanaians at that time to engaged in the aforementioned 
events, and the reactions and responses to the nationalist events by the colonial government. The 
three major political parties, UGCC, CPP, and NLM which were examined were all driven by a 
common purpose of achieving independence for Gold Coast, however, NLM was more or less an 
Asante nationalism in its character and outlook than a national party. These parties organised 
rallies, established branches, participated in general elections, and in some occasions their 
activities had a direct confrontation with the government. One unique thing about these political 
parties was the use of newspapers for propaganda and the dissemination of their ideas and aims. 
The leadership of these parties made political capital from some events in the colony in order to 
achieve their goals. The colonial government accused the party leaders on the basis of communist 
infiltrations, arrested and even jailed some of the leaders for the violations of the laws of Gold 
Coast. 
The Anti-inflation boycott organised by Nii Kwabena Bonne III was geared towards a 
reduction of prices of goods by the foreign firms who sold their goods at exorbitant prices. The 
organizer established committees, cooperated with the chiefs, and succeeded in bringing the 
government, the chiefs, the foreign firms, and the boycott committee to the negotiation table. 
Prices of goods were reduced eventually and that ended the boycott. The 1948 Riot was sparked 
off by the protest march of the ex-servicemen which went haywire, and subsequent use of force to 
quell the protest by the colonial government. It resulted in the burning and looting of European 
shops in Accra, and other towns. By the time law and order was restored, there were many fatalities 
and casualties as well as destruction of properties. 
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The last nationalist activity this chapter discussed was the Nkrumah-led Positive Action. It 
made use of civil disobedience and strike action of workers. It was organised due to the 
dissatisfaction of the CPP of the work and the report of the Coussey Constitutional Committee. 
The government declared a state of emergency, imposed dusk to dawn curfew on the big towns, 
arrested some of the leaders of CPP including Nkrumah. Nkrumah and some others were later tried 


















3.0 THE SECOND WORLD WAR AS A CATALYST OF NATIONALISM: THE POST-
SECOND WORLD WAR CONDITIONS THAT INFLUENCED NATIONALISM IN 
GOLD COAST. 
This chapter discusses the factors which promoted nationalism in Gold Coast after WW II, 
and how WW II also acted as a catalyst in promoting nationalist activities. For the purpose of this 
chapter, the factors will be discussed under economic, social and political sections. It must be 
emphasized that a myriad of factors accounted for nationalism after WW II in Ghana, however, 
this chapter will limit its scope to lack of educational facilities, shortage of housing facilities in the 
cities, and the ‘broken myth’ surrounding the white man’s superiority after WW II, as the social 
factors. The economic factors examine the shortage and high prices of imported goods, and the 
swollen shoot disease which affected the cocoa industry. The political factors will discuss the 
discontent of the educated elites against the 1946 Burns Constitution of Gold Coast, and the 
grievances of the ex-servicemen. 
3.1 Social Factors That Promoted Nationalism in Ghana after WW II 
The first social factor worth discussing with regard to the causes of nationalism in Ghana 
after WW II is lack of educational facilities. The Watson Commission Report on the 1948 
Disturbances stated categorically that the alleged slow development of educational facilities in 
spite of a growing demand, and the almost complete failure to provide any technical or vocational 
training in Gold Coast was one of the social causes of the 1948 Riot.151 The report further stated, 
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“It is, of course, true that the educational facilities are inadequate in relation to the number of 
children to be educated and we are told that the full development of universal primary education 
would take at least twenty years to achieve if finance and other factors are taken into 
consideration”.152 The commission report, as of 1948, also provided the following startling 
revelations: 
There were 578 government and government-assisted primary and middle schools, and 
2018 non-assisted schools. Government-assisted secondary schools were 10, and non-
assisted schools were 13. The non-assisted schools were often ill-equipped, ill-housed, and 
staffed by untrained teachers. The total number of teachers in Techer Training Colleges 
were 1266. The government had only one technical school. Higher education facilities in 
Gold Coast consisted of Intermediate courses in engineering, science, arts and commerce, 
centred in Achimota, with an enrollment of about 100 students.153 
This shambolic system of education was set against the backdrop of deep-rooted and widespread 
in education by the people of Gold Coast, especially the youth.154 There was also a stimulation in 
demand for education due to the post- WW II economic boom in Gold Coast.155 WW II-driven 
economic boom in terms of increase in the price of cocoa and other export commodities provided 
most people with the financial muscle to pay for quality education in Gold Coast. The 
government’s inability to provide educational facilities became a stimulus of nationalism. In 1945, 
the Elliot Commission which was charged to look into issues concerning education in British West 
Africa, recommended the establishment of a university in each of the British colonies to meet the 
needs of African teaching and investigation.156 There was a clear indication from the above report 
that the need to establish a university college in Gold Coast was a necessity, but sadly enough, the 
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colonial government did nothing about the recommendation three years after the report, and had 
no immediate plans to do so until the 1948 riot erupted. It is no doubt that the lukewarm attitude 
of the colonial government towards education infuriated the youth and the educated elites to take 
active part in nationalist activities. The youth vented their frustrations and anger against the 
government in the 1948 riot. The core of CPP was made up of the teeming youth, it was out of the 
committee for youth organization that the CPP was born.157 The youth and many others who saw 
access to quality education as a tool for national and personal advancement considered the 
continuous existence of colonial rule as an impediment to their progress, and consequently took 
active part in nationalism to remove the impediment. 
The next social factor that promoted post-WW II nationalism was the acute shortage of 
housing especially, in the cities. The post- WW II acute housing shortage in the cities not only 
made the colonial government unpopular, but it also made the masses develop a revulsion against 
the political regime. The Watson Commission gave a cogent reason why the acute housing problem 
in Gold Coast at the time of the 1948 riot was a contributing factor to the causes of the riot, and 
hence radical nationalism: 
Nothing contributes more to social unrest than shortage of houses for the people. 
The Gold Coast in common with most parts of the inhabited globe suffers from this 
shortage, but with added factors making for greater discontent. Housing conditions 
in rural areas call for greater and concerted effort in their improvement. In the towns 
also there is great need for accelerated slum clearance. We were appalled by some 
of the areas in Accra which reflect the industrial revolution at its worst.158 
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The commission report went on to recommend that, “the most urgent efforts must be made to 
increase the tempo of the building [that the government had planned to do] everywhere, and the 
matter should be regarded as a first priority.”159 
The above evidence shows the housing problem was not only confined to the towns and the cities, 
but the rural housing also needed a radical facelift as well. This was partly why the post-WW II 
activism did not only become a city affair as was in the case of pre-WW II nationalism, but it was 
also prevalent in the rural areas. Both urban and rural dwellers actively participated in the major 
nationalist activities such as the Anti-inflation boycott, and political party activities. 
To add insult to injury, in the face of the acute dearth of housing facilities in the cities, 
racial discrimination influenced the distribution of the few existing well-built government housing 
facilities. Sir Alan Burns, upon his arrival in the Gold Coast in 1941, condemned the reprehensible 
practice of the compulsory segregation of African and European senior civil servants and the 
judicial workers such as judges on account of race, and he vowed to amend the law to end that 
practice.160 This promise turned out to be only a lip-service. Seven years after the promise of Alan 
Burns, the Watson Commission report condemned the repugnant situation of Africans living in 
low standard houses as compared to the magnificent settlement of the Europeans.161 The clear case 
of racial discrimination in the distribution of the existing insufficient housing facilities, in addition 
to the untold hardship brought on the Ghanaians as a result of the acute shortage of houses 
propelled the Ghanaians to actively participate in nationalist activities to vent their anger and 
disaffection against the government. 
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The last social factor that also precipitated nationalism was the broken ‘myth’ surrounding 
the white man’s superiority. The colonial period in Gold Coast created a master-servant 
relationship between the British and the people of Gold Coast respectively. Africans in Gold Coast 
who held similar posts in the civil service with their European counterparts were given lower 
salaries, while the Europeans were given higher salaries.162 Most of the senior positions in the civil 
service were also exclusively reserved for the Europeans.163 As pointed out earlier, in terms of 
housing, there was compulsory segregation on account of race as regards the use of housing 
facilities. The colonial government created European reservations purposely to house the European 
officials, while the Africans of similar positions lived in the slums.164 The psychological effect of 
this deliberate master-servant administrative architecture was to make the Africans feel inferior. It 
developed a myth of European superiority among the people of Gold Coast. This explains why the 
pre-WW II nationalism lacked any momentum of radicalism to bring an end to political 
colonialism. 
WW II changed the above status quo. The experiences of the ex-servicemen in WW II 
changed the narration. African and white soldiers fought together in Burma, Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Europe and in all these places they fought on the same terms and lived under the same 
conditions.165 Some Africans such as the Ghanaian, Seth Anthony, rose to officer rank and were 
put in command of white men.166 All this proved that white men and black men were one and the 
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same people, and the former were not superior beings.167 Ndabaningi Sithole, a Zimbabwean 
writer, gave a scintillating description of this broken myth: 
The girls of England and France and Italy who went out with African soldiers, did not          
help the preservation of the white myth. The African soldiers found themselves at the front 
line of war with one purpose in view; to kill every white soldier they could get hold of. 
African soldiers saw white soldiers wounded, dying and dead. The bullet had the same 
effect on black and white alike. After spending four years hunting white enemy soldiers, 
the African never again regarded them as gods.168 
As a result of the shattered prestige of the white man and the myth of his inherent superiority, the 
psychological barrier for the African was removed. This explains the upsurge of nationalism on 
the part of the ex-servicemen with boldness manifested in the 1948 Riot, the Positive Action, and 
political party activities prior to the independence of Ghana. Indeed, WW II acted as a vehicle for 
nationalism. 
3.2 Economic Causes of Nationalism in Post-WW II Ghana 
The most important economic factor that influenced the majority of the people to engage 
in nationalist activities during and after WW II was the shortage and high prices of imported goods 
in Gold Coast. Prices of goods skyrocketed which brought untold hardship to the people. A Report 
on Wages and Standard of Living in Accra, 1945, stated among other things that Ghanaian salary 
earners became worse off: 
In the course of the wartime inflation of prices in this colony, the position of the various 
earning groups has changed inevitably- traders as a whole have become better off while 
fixed income groups have suffered a steady deterioration in their standard of living169. 
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While the traders were making huge profits, the local people were kicked out of the retail trade as 
a result of the government trading policies.170 Apart from the wage -earning workers who were 
hard hit by the inflation, artisans were also not left out. One particular hard-hit group were drivers, 
many of them ex-servicemen who found it difficult to get petrol except at black market prices 
under an inefficient system of rationing.171 The mass of the people then started pointing accusing 
fingers at the government, and even became more incensed that whereas the British government 
was trying to alleviate the hardships of its nationals back at home through measures like price 
regulation and other controls, the Ghanaian was left at the mercy of profiteering foreign 
businessmen and their agents.172  The local people at this point were habouring an indignation and 
looked for an opportune time to explode it out against the colonial regime. Consequently, they 
vented their anger out in nationalist activities such as the boycott of imported European goods, 
the1948 riot, political party activities, and radical strike actions. The Watson Commission Report 
on the Disturbances, 1948, confirmed the shortage of imported goods and its subsequent price 
hikes as one of the economic causes of the riot, and the anti-inflation boycott of imported goods.173 
The local people blamed the colonial government for the economic woes of shortages of 
European goods and its associated inflation on the colonial government. This blame on the 
government was partially justifiable. Nii Kwabena Bonne III, the brain behind the nationwide anti-
inflation boycott of European goods, asserted that the colonial government had some sort of 
‘gentleman agreement’ with the foreign firms to continue to sell their goods at extortionate prices 
to the people of Gold Coast.174 This assertion of Kwabena Bonne III was confirmed by the 
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government’s initial stance on the anti-inflation boycott that it was “purely a trading dispute in 
which the government as such must remain neutral.”175 The Watson Commission Report blamed 
the government for its inaction in relation to the price hikes leading to the 1948 Riot.176 It is 
therefore not far-fetched that the nationalist activities were directed at the colonial government. At 
the time of the boycott, S.A. Mensah of Winneba, a town in Gold Coast, encouraged the people to 
use the boycott to achieve economic liberation of the colony from economic serfdom.177 Thus, the 
colonial government was seen as an emblem of economic exploitation, and the need to replace it 
with an indigenous-run self-government was considered as a desideratum of economic liberation 
by the people. This accounted for that nationwide nationalism devoid of class and economic status. 
However, it must be emphasized that the price hikes in this period cannot be entirely blamed on 
the activities of the foreign firms, AWAM, and the inaction of the government. Nii Kwabena 
Bonne III admitted in his Autobiography that in November 1941, the colonial government 
explained to the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs, when the war was at its height, that the cost of 
convoys and insurance coupled with an extreme shortage of supplies due to WW II made a high 
price for goods inevitable.178 Certainly, the government’s actions and inactions had no direct 
influence on the wartime inflation. The Watson Commission also established the fact that, the 
shortage of the imported goods and its attendant hardship was partly due to the demonstrable 
curtailment of the production of goods and supplies of goods as a result of the global economic 
downturn emanating from WW II.179 For instance, in 1937 and 1946, the percentage fall of the 
supply of rice, canned meat, and canned fish was 98%, 93%, and 95% respectively.180 This clearly 
 
175 The Watson Commission Report, p.35. 
176 ibid 
177 The Autobiography of Nii Kwabena Bonne III, p.71. 
178 The Autobiography of Nii Kwabena Bonne III, p. 63. 




shows a gargantuan fall in the supplies of these much-sought after goods due to WW II. While 
WW II drastically reduced the supply of theses goods, it also resulted in putting more money in 
the pockets of the people of Gold Coast. Money incomes and wages also rose rapidly during the 
War years, due to such factors as Allied military expenditure and increased receipts for Gold Coast 
export.181  This inevitably created the situation where more money was chasing fewer goods, 
thereby causing a demand-pull inflation. It is evidently indubitable that WW II principally 
accounted for the shortage of imported goods and the galloping inflation which partly accounted 
for the nationwide radical nationalism after WW II. Thus, WW II acted as a catalyst of nationalism 
in this context. 
The next economic factor that played a pivotal role in post-WW II nationalism was the 
swollen shoot disease which affected the cocoa industry from the 1930s to the 1940s and the 
unsatisfactory approach of the colonial government in salvaging the situation. Throughout the 
colonial days, the cultivation of cocoa remained in the hands of individual local farmers who owed 
their wealth largely to this ‘golden pod’, which has been the backbone of the country’s economy. 
The Watson Commission Report confirmed and even threw more light on the contribution of the 
cocoa industry to the economy of Gold Coast in the late 1940s: 
The prosperity today of the Gold Coast depends on Cocoa. The menace 
to that prosperity is " Swollen Shoot". Upon cocoa, so far as yet seen, depend 
the plans for a better country-better education, better medical attention, 





people long for. In the five pre-war years, the export of cocoa brought into the Gold Coast 
about £5,300,000 a year. This represented about 98 per cent of the value of its agricultural 
exports and not less than 63 per cent by value of the total exports.182 
 
The fact that the cocoa industry contributed about 63% to the export value of the economy, and 
the cocoa farms were solely owned by the local farmers lends credence to the fact that whatever 
affected the cocoa industry would impact on the lives of majority of the people. The output of 
cocoa production, however, shown a marked decline from the peak of 300,000 tons in 1936/37, to 
a post-war figure [1946/47] averaging about 200,000 tons (representing purchases from the 
farmer).183 The drastic fall in production was a corollary of the swollen shoot disease which 
affected 50 million cocoa trees out of the total number of 400 million cocoa trees after the disease 
was first detected in 1936.184 Competent authorities estimated that the present rate of spread is 
about 15 million trees a year and that, if unchecked, the cocoa industry will  practically disappeared 
in 20 years.185 
This dire situation needed a quick and a practical response from the government to salvage 
the cocoa industry, the backbone of the economy. However, the government response was a knee-
jerk reaction. The government ordered the cutting out of the affected trees, and by December, 
1947, about 2.5 million trees were cut out without any compensation.186 Although the cutting out 
of the affected trees was the best option since the disease had no cure, and the cutting out would 
prevent further spread, the cutting out was fraught with several lapses.187 The farmers were not 
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properly educated on the nature of the disease, and the need to cut out the affected ones;  some of 
the labourers received bribes and spared some farms; the false rumour of the British plan to destroy 
Ghana’s cocoa industry before they leave the colony; the system where labourers were paid by the 
number of affected trees they cut out led to indiscriminate cutting out of both healthy and diseased 
trees; and the cutting out was done without any meaningful compensation to the farmers, they were 
given £12 per acre.188 Added to the above, the government was more interested in increasing food 
production and the production of vegetable oils, and consequently, the government 
overconcentrated on WW II-related issues and little was done to combat the disease.189 The 
colonial government admitted that the Watson Commission criticisms against the colonial 
administration on the cutting out of the cocoa trees were probably fair, and that the cutting out 
campaign had been badly handled.190 
Both the political elites and the local farmers took advantage of the situation to engaged in 
nationalism to end colonialism. The colonial authority was perceived as directly responsible for 
the woes of the cocoa industry. Dr. J.B Danquah pointed it out to the Watson Commission, “it was 
scientifically sound to carry the mass eradication of the affected cocoa trees, but it was politically 
inexpedient.”191 The farmers also opposed the cutting out campaign because WW II resulted in 
astronomical increase in the price of cocoa, and the cutting out meant loss of huge revenue to the 
farmers. In 1946, the world price for cocoa was £49.8 per ton (farm gate price £27 per ton), and in 
1947, it was increased to £155 per ton (farm gate price £51.3 per ton).192 By 1948, it reached £238 
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per ton, while the farm gate  price was £74.7 per ton.193 Thus, WW II made the government to lose 
focus on the cocoa menace, and it also increased the price of the cocoa for any rational economic 
farmer to resist the cutting out policy which in the short-run will affect his cocoa production output. 
Indeed, an important correlation existed between nationalist politics and rural unrest in Ghana's 
cocoa districts in the years preceding self- rule.194 The major interest groups in this economic and 
political configuration were rural farmers and traditional chiefs along with urban politicians, whose 
collective reaction to colonial administrative measures on swollen shoot control of the cocoa tree 
disease generated a major political crisis in Ghana that eventually paved the way for Ghana's 
political independence.195 This was another reason why the cocoa growing areas in Gold Coast 
actively took part in nationalist activities such as the 1948 Riot, and political party activities in 
collaboration with the urban-based political elites. 
3.3 Political Factors that Promoted Nationalism in Post-WW II Gold Coast 
The discontent of the educated elites against the 1946 Burns Constitution was one of the 
factors that promoted nationalism after WW II. Sir Alan Burns was the British colonial governor 
of Gold Coast from 1941 to 1947. He promulgated the 1946 Constitution of Ghana as a response 
to the growing demands for a radical constitution from the educated elites. However, the Burns 
Constitution of 1946 did not meet the expectations of the educated elites. The educated elites saw 
the Burns Constitution as a constitution designed to give more powers to the chiefs and was 
therefore a deliberate attempt to stifle their political aspirations. Thus, the intelligentsia became 
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frustrated. “The Legislative Council consist of a President appointed by the Governor or, if no 
such appointment has been made, of the Governor himself as President; six ex-officio 
members, who are those who serve on the Executive Councill with the exception of the 
the director of medical services; eighteen elected members of whom nine represent the 
colony and are elected by the Joint Provincial Council, four represent Ashanti and are elected by 
the Ashanti confederacy Council, and five represent the municipalities of Accra (two) Cape Coast, 
Sekondi-Takoradi and Kumasi (one each); and six members nominated by the Governor.”196 What 
this provision in the constitution meant was that, the chiefs will have a majority representation of 
thirteen members in the Legislative Council, while the educated elites will only have five 
members. Furthermore, the constitution states that “If the Governor considers that it is expedient 
in the interest of public order, public faith, or good government that any Bill should be introduced, 
or any motion proposed and if the Council fails to pass such Bill or motion, the Governor may by 
declaration order that such Bill Or motion shall have effect.”197 This in effect also meant that the 
governor had the power to decree any law he deemed it fit without going to the Legislative Council. 
The fact that thirteen of the eighteen Ghanaian seats [in the legislative assembly] were to 
be filled by the traditional rulers meant a virtual return to the period of so-called ‘indirect rule’ and 
the supremacy of chiefs or traditional rulers in national affairs, much to the disgust and 
disappointment of the intelligentsia, the ex-servicemen and the youth. The constitution, thus, 
became an impediment to the much- desired political participation of the educated elites. All of 
these groups subsequently turned against the chiefs as well as the colonial authorities. The 
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constitution also failed to give political franchise to all the colony, it limited it to the four 
municipalities of Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Kumasi. In effect, the teeming youth 
in Gold Coast after WW II had no say in the political administration of the colony. The Burns 
Constitution of 1946 infuriated the educated elites who were epitomized by the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC), a political party that was formed in 1947, and its leaders like J. B. Danquah, 
Kwame Nkrumah, Ofori Attah, and Arko Adjei. These leaders were looking forward to seeing a 
radical political change in the Gold Coast after WW II, but the Burns Constitution failed woefully 
to give such a radical change, and this created an enabling environment for radical nationalism. 
The Watson Commission unearthed several weaknesses of the Burns Constitution which 
contributed to the 1948 Riot: 
An examination of the constitution will show that the concession of an African elected 
majority in the Legislature, in the absence of any real political power, provided no outlet 
for a people eagerly emerging into political consciousness. On the other hand, it provided 
a powerful stimulant for intelligent discontent. The real and effective political government 
remained in the hands of the Executive Council. Composed of ex officio and nominated 
members it was the instrument of power. The Legislature was largely a Chamber of 
debate… The 1946 Constitution did nothing to decentralise the machinery of 
government… We have found an intense suspicion that the Chiefs are being used by the 
Government as an instrument for the delay if not suppression of the political aspirations of 
the people.198 
Considering the fact that the 1946 Constitution was an improvement over the 1925 constitution, 
but it was rejected by the educated elites meant that certain external factors played a role. The 
declaration of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 at the time of WW II, which espoused self-
determination raised the hopes of the educated elites for a radical constitution which would 
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guarantee self-government.199 Clement Atlee in his address to the West African Students’ Union 
in 1941, said, “ We in the Labour Party have always demanded that the freedom which we claim 
for ourselves shall be extended to all…I look for an ever increasing measure of self-government 
and political freedom in Africa.”200 Atlee extended the tenants in the declaration of the Atlantic 
Charter to the Africans too. These might had boldened the nationalist of whom some were part of 
the West African Students’ Union to ask for a more radical constitution at the time Atlee became 
a prime minister. The Watson Commission Report further stated, “large numbers [of Ghanaians in 
the post-war era] had their horizons widened and their political consciousness stimulated by 
service in the Forces abroad and close contacts with other peoples, in that background the 1946 
Constitution was outmoded at birth.”201 
These are clear indications that WW II, did not only influence nationalism in the social and 
economic circles, but politically, it was a driving force behind radical nationalism. In the midst of 
these external political consciousness of self-determination coupled with the shortfalls of the 1946 
constitution, the 1946 Constitution became a stimulus for political activism and nationalism. 
Finally, the grievances of the ex-servicemen against the colonial government played a 
significant role in the radical nationalism in post-WW II Gold Coast. The ex-servicemen in the 
Gold Coast were the demobilised soldiers who participated in the WW II on the side of the British. 
They formed a vibrant association known as the Gold Coast Ex-Servicemen’s Union, and their 
secretary was Mr. Tamakloe.202 The demobilised ex-servicemen were about 65,000 in Gold Coast 
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after WW II.203 They had several grievances against the colonial government for the following 
reasons. The Watson Commission concluded that the  failure to fulfil perceived job promises to 
the  ex-service as one of their grievances.204 However, it saw the job promises as a figment of  
imagination: the ex-service men expectation of job promises might have be born out of 
misapprehension about their prospects of demobilization since the ‘Release and Resettlement’, a 
booklet which spelt out the terms and conditions of demobilization never gave any assurance of 
employment to the ex-servicemen upon their return to Gold Coast.205 The commission report 
further cited  insufficiency of disablement pension rate as against an ever rising high cost of living, 
and the failure on the part of the government to provide grants to men too old to enter government 
service  and to men anxious to start their business on their own account as was done in the United 
Kingdom as one of the grievances of the ex-service men leading to the riot.206 
In addition to the above grievances, the ex-servicemen wanted a provision to be made by 
the government to exempt them from payment of all state levies for a period of five years.207 This 
request was made due to their sacrifice they made for the breaking of the yoke of Nazism 
imposition on the British and her allies. The government probably rejected this request to avoid 
making the ex-servicemen ‘first class citizens’ that ought to be treated differently. They also said 
Army training in vocational work is not treated as adequate for Civilian or Government 
employment of the same kind upon demobilization.208 More so, they also lamented bitterly that 
upon being demobilised and entering the Government service full credit is not given on the 
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establishment for the period of service in the Army.209 The rest of their grievances were the lack 
of representation of the ex-servicemen in the Legislative Council; the fact that some of their men 
were improperly blacklisted by the Resettlement Department and so penalised when looking for 
work; that Africanisalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force was not being effectively 
maintained, and more African Officers should be granted Regular Commissions in the Army and 
non-commissioned officers should be encouraged to take the King's Commission; and that while 
serving in the Army racial differences persisted in such matters as food, clothing and pay210. 
Being that as it may, the colonial government was not in a position to address the multiplicity of 
the grievances of the ex-servicemen. Between 1939 and 1945, due to the exigencies of WW II, 
Gold Coast supported the British with an amount of £361,696.211 This might have drained the Gold 
Coast coffers to continue to spend money on WW II related issues. Also, the colonial government 
was faced with pressure to expand social infrastructure. The government had on the agenda to 
execute (i) the Volta Scheme; (ii) Extension to Takoradi Harbour; (iii) a major experimental 
scheme in mechanised agriculture in the South on the lines of Damongo in the North; (iv) 
Extension of railways; of roads; of electricity, and water supply; building houses, hospitals; (v) 
Completion of University College on the new site, and of the Regional Technical College at 
Kumasi, and (vi) Establishment of major enterprises: sawmills, cement work, brick works, and 
canning works.212 The colonial office was motivated to see to the execution of these projects at the 
expense of satisfying the numerous grievances of the ex-servicemen to prove to the world that 
democracy is an effective and superior alternative to Communism in that it does not only allow 
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people to think their own thoughts and grow their own way, but also has power to solve immediate 
material problems.213 Britain, a leading proponent of democracy and adherent of democracy was 
influenced by the Cold War, a bye-product of WW II, in matters relating to the decision making 
in Gold Coast. 
The ex-servicemen, having the prestige surrounding the myth of white man’s superiority 
shattered in their minds as a result of their participation in WW II, joined forces with the educated 
elites to actively participate in radical nationalism. For instance, prior to the 1948 Riot, the ex-
servicemen held Ex-servicemen Rally on 18th February, 1948, in Palladium Cinema at Accra, with 
some leading members of the UGCC working committee chaired by Dr. J.B. Danquah.214 On 27th 
February, a day before the 1948 Riot, in another mass meeting, the ex-servicemen were exhorted 
by the UGCC leaders to parade at the old Polo Ground at 1 p.m. on the following day, when they 
would be given further instructions.215 Nkrumah was reticent on the tacit role the working 
committee played in collaboration with the ex-servicemen leading to the 1948 Riot when he 
discussed the riot in his Autobiography.216 He probably wanted to create an impression that the 
arrest and detention of the UGGCC working committee members was wrong, and was only meant 
to intimidate the UGGCC leadership. The ex-servicemen march on 28th February resulted in the 
immediate trigger of the 1948 Riot, which became the turning point in Ghana’s decolonization 
drive. Some of the ex-servicemen participated in the Positive Action, and they clashed with the 
colonial police which resulted in the death of two of the policemen.217 
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Clearly, WW II created over 65 000 ex-servicemen in Gold Coast after the war. Their discontent 
with the government put them in a disposition to collaborate with the rest of people especially the 
educated elites to eventually end political colonialism in Ghana. It is therefore not far-fetched to 
say WW II acted as a catalyst to promote nationalism in Gold Coast. Without WW II, the 1948 
Riot would not have happened let alone the Watson Commission and subsequent drafting of the 
1951 elections. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on some factors that promoted nationalism in Ghana after WW II, 
and how WW II acted as a catalyst in promoting nationalism. These factors were discussed on the 
themes of social, economic and political. Under the social factors, lack of educational facilities 
was discussed. It inspired the youth who saw education as a means to add economic value to 
themselves to engaged in nationalism and activism against the colonial regime, whom the people 
of Gold Coast deemed as an obstacle to their educational progress. This was because WW II-driven 
economic boom gave the people the good financial standing to pay for quality and higher 
education, hence the failure of the government to provide the needed educational facilities made 
the people to deem colonialism as agent of economic stagnation. This chapter also demonstrated 
how the acute shortage of housing facilities, coupled with racial discrimination in the allocation of 
the existing government housing facilities angered the people to demand and end of colonial rule 
in the form of nationalist activities. Also, this chapter elucidated how the ex-servicemen 
participation in WW II shattered the psychological myth surrounding the superiority of the white 
man, hence, it led to an increase in radical nationalism in post-WW II in Ghana. 
This chapter examined the economic factors that promoted nationalism in Ghana after WW 
II from the perspective of shortage of imported goods and inflation, and the unsatisfactory 
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government policy to deal with the swollen shoot disease which affected the cocoa industry. The 
chapter laid emphasis on the reasons for the shortage of the imported goods, and its subsequent 
inflation, and how it conspired with other factors to increase the tempo of nationalism. Also, this 
chapter expounded the reasons why the government policy to deal with the swollen shoot disease 
was met with anger and opposition, and additionally, the role WW II played in making the 
government ineffective in dealing with the disease. The chapter also gave reasons why WW II 
made farmers to reject the cutting out of affected tress policy. 
The political section discussed the defects of the Burns Constitution which in effect, denied 
the educated elites the much-desired political participation. It also discussed the political 
atmosphere WW II created which made the nationalists to reject the Burns Constitution, and 
actively engaged in nationalism to end colonialism. The chapter also discussed the grievances of 
the ex-servicemen who participated in WW II and how their grievances disposed them to 












4.0 THE 1948 RIOT: THE TURNING POINT OF GHANA’S DECOLONISATION 
DRIVE 
Chapter four throws light on how the 1948 Riot influenced Ghana’s independence. It will 
discuss how the impact of the riot carved the path for Ghana’s decolonization. This will be 
discussed in three main thematic sections. Firstly, the riot created an upsurge in the political 
consciousness and political temperature of Gold Coast. Under this theme, death, casualties and 
destruction of properties, the making of political capital from the riot by the UGCC leaders, the 
use of emergency powers and the arrest and detention of the UGCC leaders by the colonial 
administration, and the Watson Commission Report that brought to light the lukewarm attitude of 
the government in solving the problems facing Gold Coast, will be examined. The next impact of 
the riot which paved the way for Ghana’s decolonization was the breaking away of Nkrumah from 
the UGCC to form the CPP, the party that eventually won independence for Ghana. This aspect 
will delve into how the arrest and detention of the UGCC leaders widened the gap between the 
other working committee members, and Nkrumah. Also, the Watson Commission probe which 
established Nkrumah as a pro-communist politician, and Nkrumah’s exclusion from the Coussey 
Committee will be examined under this section. Finally, this chapter will elaborate on how the 
1948 Riot birthed the 1951 Constitution which became the road to Ghana’s independence. Under 
this theme, this section will discuss how the riot changed Britain’s slow approach in granting Gold 
Coast a radical constitution, and how the 1951 Constitution prepared Gold Coast political elites to 




4.1 Upsurge in Political Consciousness and Temperature 
The 1948 Riot created an upsurge in political consciousness, and temperature in Gold 
Coast.  Political consciousness in this context connotes the growing awareness of the people of 
Gold Coast about governance related issues, and the creation of awakening spirit in the people to 
play an active role to dismantle colonial rule.  In the first place, the riot resulted in the destruction 
of life and properties, and varying degrees of casualties, which was unprecedented in the annals of 
Gold Coast since British colonialism officially began in 1874. There were some forms of resistance 
against colonial rule, but none were bloody, and catastrophic as was the case of the riot. For 
instance, the 1937 cocoa boycott and hold-ups which led to the setting up of the Nowell 
Commission was not bloody.218 Again, the Nii Kwabena Bonne-led Anti-inflation campaign was 
devoid of violence and bloodshed. However, in the case of the 1948 Riot, it resulted in the death 
of 29 people, while 237 others sustained varying degrees of injuries, and property damage was 
estimated to be £2 million.219 The death, casualties, and destruction of properties were not confined 
to Accra, or only one city, but it was prevalent in many cities and towns such as Kumasi and its 
environs, Kibi, Akuse, Suhum, Nsawam and Sekondi-Takoradi.220 This situation made all and 
sundry aware of the political condition in Gold Coast, and how the colonial government was using 
the security agencies to brutally maintained law and order. It made the people of Gold Coast 
curious and more interested the political issues. This was manifested in the way the youth, the 
chiefs, the educated elites and even farmers were involved in political party activities, strike actions 
such as the positive action, after the riot. For example, on the 12th of June, 1949, Nkrumah launched 
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his new founded CPP before an audience of sixty thousand people in Accra.221 This was as a result 
of the upsurge of political consciousness which was attributable to the 1948 Riot. 
Furthermore, another way by which the riot increased political consciousness in Gold Coast 
was the fact that, the UGCC leaders seized the opportunity to make political capital from the riot. 
The Watson Commission Report contended that, “ but we are constrained to observe that the only 
persons likely to reap any political advantage of the total breakdown of the machinery of 
government, [as a result of the 1948 Riot] so far as we have been able to discover were the members 
of the Convention [UGCC].”222 The secretary of state, Creech Jones in his letter to the Prime 
Minister, Clement Atlee on July 19th, 1948, also stated that the Watson Commission found that the 
Gold Coast Convention were active in exploiting the disturbances, although there is no direct 
evidence that they actually promoted them.223 Indeed, the Commission was right in their 
assessment of the situation. The UGCC did everything it could to take political advantage of the 
situation. Having made their own appreciation of the situation, the United Gold Coast Convention 
telegraphed on the 29th February to the Secretary of State. They stated, among other things: 
Unless colonial government is changed and a new government of the people and chiefs     
installed at the centre immediately, conduct of masses now completely out of control with 
strikes threaten [sic] in police quarters and rank and file of police indifferent to orders of 
officers will continue and result in worse violence and irresponsible acts by uncontrolled 
people. The working committee of the United Gold Coast Convention are prepared and 
ready to take interim Government.224 
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Although the riot disrupted law and order, the UGCC created an impression in their 
telegraphy to the secretary of state that the government is incompetent in handling the situation, 
and it will only take the working committee of the UGCC to calm the storms if they were allowed 
to form an interim government. The Convention and the newspapers supporting it have been at 
pains to paint the situation as being out of hand and the Convention as the only people capable of 
restoring it.225 As the UGCC engaged in activities to fish from the troubled political waters created 
by the riot in collaboration of the local newspapers in their bid to reap political advantage of the 
situation, it helped to increase the political consciousness in Gold Coast. 
When the government used the declaration of state of emergency, newspaper censorship, 
and the security to contained the situation, the UGCC varied its tactics by placing emphasis on the 
violence of the Government's methods.226 The government further accused the UGCC of inflaming 
race feelings, and using ex-servicemen as tools, and as good cover for violent action, and 
stimulation of the rougher types of the population against the government.227 This acts of the 
UGCC in no means a measure, increased the political temperature and consciousness of Gold 
Coast. The colonial office admitted after the 1948 Riot that in the Gold Coast, the political 
consciousness of the native has developed more rapidly than in the rest of British West Africa and 
political power lies nearer to the hands of African leaders.228 Consequently, politics, which was 
hitherto the business of the traditional rulers and the educated elites came to encompassed the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC), farmers, ex-servicemen, students, and both urban and rural dwellers 
after the riot. The 1948 Riot became the turning point for Ghana’s decolonization as it provided 
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the needed obtrusive political consciousness, and unquenchable political temperature needed for 
self-government. 
Another way the riot increased the political temperature and the political consciousness in 
Gold Coast was the use of the emergency powers and the arrest and detention of the working 
committee members of the UGCC by the colonial government. When the riot erupted on 28th 
February, the existing Defence of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Ordinance, Cap. 49 was used for 
the imposition and enforcement of a curfew in various centres.229 In seeking fully to restore a 
regime of law and order, the Government's ultimate objective was to create conditions under which 
Government and the people can work together for the redress of genuine grievances and the swift 
development of the country for the benefit of its people.230 The government deemed it as a matter 
of necessity to ensure that all factors which might militate against the maintenance of law and 
order are eradicated or at least immunized.231 As a matter of urgency, on the 2nd March, the 
Governor was advised that he might properly apply the U.K. Emergency Powers Order in Council, 
1939, Part 11 of which confers far more extensive powers than the local Ordinance.232 The 
Governor applied this Order in Council with effect from the 3rd March.233 He subsequently, on 
the 4th March, promulgated subsidiary legislation [Regulation 29] to cover: (a) the censorship of 
the press; (b) the spreading of disaffection by other means; and (c) the control of movement by 
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road, rail, etc. and certain other supplementary matters.234 An order prohibiting any publication of 
newspapers, posters or pamphlets without permission was imposed on Gold Coast.235 
Gold Coast at this time had a number of vibrant newspapers such as the Gold Coast 
Methodist Times, the Sekondi Morning Telegraph, and the Cape Coast Daily Mail. The Watson 
Commission seemed to have sanctioned the press censorship because it admitted that immediately 
after the riot, the press tone and content were calculated to inflame the populace, to keep alive 
public tension and to provoke further mischief.236   The Watson Commission Report described 
Gold Coast as “a country where mass education was eagerly sought”.237 The press censorship by 
the government under  Regulation 29 made the whole colony, especially the educated ones to feel 
the heat of the use of the colonial emergency powers. It went a long way to attract people’s 
attention to the political discourse in Gold Coast, and hence the upsurge in political consciousness. 
Again, the use of the emergency powers to control the movement of people by road and rail was 
the first of its kind. But the security situation at that time necessitated the use of the emergency 
powers for the government to stump her authority in the colony to restore law and order.  It 
certainly increased the political tension, and made many people to follow issues on national politics 
as to when such measures would be suspended, thereby increasing the political consciousness in 
Gold Coast. 
The arrest and detention of the six working committee members of the UGCC also 
precipitated an upsurge in political consciousness and political temperature. On 13th March 
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Governor of Gold Coast made an order, under powers available to him, to restrict the movements 
of six persons to an appointed area, a measure which was considered preventive and not 
punitive.238 It was designed to prevent the six men from endangering public safety until the causes 
of the present disturbances can be investigated by the impartial commission before which the six 
men will be allowed to appear.239 In the judgment of the government, the leaders of the UGCC had 
become a conduit for communist infiltration, and there was the need to apprehend, and incarcerate 
them to maintain law and order. This stance of the government, as it had been established earlier, 
had been proven to be blown out of proportion by the Watson Commission. The Commission also 
bemoaned the arrest and detention of the leaders, saying it, “deprived His Majesty's Judges in the 
Gold Coast, of jurisdiction to entertain an application by a subject, detained otherwise than 
pursuant to a warrant issuing out of a Court of competent jurisdiction, the assumption of such a 
power was excessive to the occasion and we unresistingly condemn it.”240 
However, the arrest and detention, created and upsurge in political consciousness. In the 
first place, no charges were proffered against the UGCC leaders. This certainly created an 
impression in the minds of the well- meaning people of Gold Coast that it was a calculated attempt 
to intimidate the leaders of the only political party who wanted to rescue the people from the 
shackles of colonialism. Even back in London, the arrest and detention of the leaders created a 
political spectacle. In a letter from the secretary of state, Creech Jones to Sir Geral Creasy, the 
Gold Coast governor, he pointed out that there were “ propaganda here[in Britain] from the 
extreme left directed against all government efforts and policy in the Gold Coast and reviling the 
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Colonial Office, and there is also some uneasiness about the denial to the six men restrained of the 
right of access to the Court for Habeas Corpus.”241 If even in London, there was a growing 
propaganda and uneasiness in the political atmosphere as a result of the arrest and detention of the 
UGCC leaders, it was  certain that the arrest and detention of the UGCC leaders increased the 
political consciousness and political temperature in Gold Coast. When the six UGCC leaders were 
first sent to Kumasi, they had to be relocated to various places in Northern Ghana after three days 
when a security intelligence was gathered that some of the youth led by the fearless Krobo Edusei 
had planned to attack and release them from prisons.242 
Furthermore, the arrest of the six leaders, and their movements to many parts of the country 
helped to spread the information and the news of the political happenings in Accra to most places 
in Gold Coast. Nkrumah remarked in his Autobiography that: 
The news of our plight and of our journey northwards had already reached Tamale by the 
time we arrived, and crowds of people had assembled to see us. But it was a sad crowd and 
both men and women were weeping. It seemed almost as if we were on our last journey to 
the scaffold. Beyond anything else, however, the very sight of us must have aroused 
sympathy for, owing to excessive dust on the road, we were completed covered by a film 
of dirt, so much so that it was impossible to distinguish one from the other of us.243 
Eventually, the six leaders became famous all over God Coast and were regarded as national 
heroes, hence the name ‘The Big Six’.244 It is therefore an incontrovertible fact that the arrest of 
the six UGCC leaders resulted in the upsurge of political consciousness in Gold Coast which 
prepared the people psychologically to embrace the reality of self-rule after the 1948 Riot. 
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Finally, the work and activities of the Watson Commission contributed to the upsurge in 
the political consciousness of Gold Coast after the riot. The commission in the first place opened 
its door to people from all walks of life in Gold Coast in their bid to probe the causes of the riot. 
The commission received and examined in all no less than 187 memoranda from individuals and 
organisations throughout the Gold Coast dealing with a great diversity of subjects from different 
parts of the colony.245 The commission also interviewed government officials, security officers, 
some members of the UGCC, farmers, traditional rulers, some ex-servicemen, and traders in every 
nook and cranny in Gold Coast.246 The interview of these people from diverse backgrounds and 
the sending of the memoranda to the commission created awareness of the political activities in 
Gold Coast which culminated in preparing the minds of Ghanaians to embrace and participate the 
struggle for independence. Again, the commission helped to unearth the colonial government 
inefficiencies and lackadaisical approach in solving the political, social and economic problems of 
the Gold Coast. For instance, as it was indicated in Chapter Three, lack of educational facilities, 
acute shortage of houses in the cities coupled with racial discrimination, inflation, and lack of 
political participation on the part of the educated elites were serious issues that contributed to the 
disturbances. 
Due to the fact that the commission sitting was a public hearing, and a complete daily 
transcript of the proceedings was supplied to the Press even before the commission came out with 
its report, many people of Gold Coast became aware of the lapses of the colonial government 
which partly accounted for the woes and the hardship in Gold Coast.247 This did not only result in 
an upsurge of political consciousness, but it also made it a necessity among the people to fight and 
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end colonial rule in order to extricate themselves from such predicaments. In March, 1949, the 
colonial government in a letter to the colonial office in London expressed hope that the move to 
improve the organization of sport in the Gold Coast would help to divert 
political excitement into other channels.248 This corroborates the fact that the riot caused an 
upsurge of political consciousness and political temperature in Gold Coast. 
4.2 The Breaking Away of Nkrumah from the UGCC 
One earth-shocking impact of the riot was the fact that it precipitated the breaking away of 
Nkrumah from the UGCC to form the CPP, his own political which eventually won independence 
for Ghana. In the first place, the post-1948 Riot arrest and detention of the six working committee 
members of the UGCC widened the gap between Nkrumah on one side, and the rest of the members 
on the other side. It must be emphasized that prior to the riot, Nkrumah had an excellent-working 
relation with the rest of the working committee members. For instance, J.B. Danquah went round 
most part of the country as part of the familiarization tour to introduce Nkrumah to the people as 
the new general secretary of the UGCC. A case in point was when Danquah drove Nkrumah to 
Kwahu Mpraeso and introduced him to the people amidst paying glowing tributes to Nkrumah.249 
Nkrumah himself intimated in his Autobiography that he and the rest of the working committee 
members decided on the colours of the UGCC without difficulty when they settled on red, white 
and gold.250 Nkrumah together with the rest of the working committee members organised rallies, 
and even sent a telegraph to the colonial secretary of state’s devoid of any acrimony among them. 
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Later after independence, Nkrumah remarked in his Autobiography that he initially concluded 
when he was invited by the UGCC leaders that, “it was quite useless to associate myself with a 
movement backed almost entirely by reactionaries, middle-class lawyers and merchants, for his 
revolutionary background and ideas would make it impossible for him to work with them.”251  
Clearly, this was an ex post facto rationalization of the impasse between him and the UGCC 
leaders, for he worked with them amicably prior to the 1948 Riot. 
The cordial working relationship between Nkrumah, and the rest of the five working 
committee became fraught with discord after their arrest. When the six working committee 
members were apprehended and incarcerated together in Kumasi, anytime they discussed issues 
relating to the UGCC, Nkrumah  became painfully aware that they were losing interest in him 
because whenever they entered into a discussion, the five of them would always make a point of 
supporting the opposite point of view to his, and nothing he proposed was acceptable to them.252 
Nkrumah even claimed that the rest of the UGCC leaders blamed him for their arrest and detention, 
and showed signs of regret for inviting him for taking the position of the general secretary of 
UGCC.253 The post-1948 discord between Nkrumah and the rest of the UGCC leaders once again 
reared its ugly head on the issue of the formation of the National College, now Ghana National 
College in Cape Coast. When the ‘big six’ were capriciously arrested and detained without trial by 
the government, some students in the secondary schools demonstrated for their release, and these 
students were later dismissed by their various secondary schools.254 Nkrumah upon release from 
his solitary confinement founded the Ghana College to prepare the students for their final 
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examination upon the passionate appeal by the students and their parents.255 This resulted in 
another imbroglio between Nkrumah and the UGCC leaders. The UGCC leaders opined that 
Nkrumah took a unilateral decision, and that the formation of the college was a repudiation of the 
Education Department Regulations of Gold Coast.256 Nkrumah on his part expressed utter shock 
and dismay and insisted that the UGGC leaders were duly informed about the founding of the 
college; and also argued that the formation of the college would inure to the benefit of  the 
UGCC.257 But it was clear that though Nkrumah might have informed the working committee 
about the idea of founding a school to help the students who became victims of circumstances, he 
did not get their blessings and the green light to do so. For Nkrumah to have founded the school 
without the approbation of the working committee was tantamount to Nkrumah taking unilateral 
decision to increase his political fortunes, only to put the neck of the UGCC on the block. Thus, 
the arrest of the ‘big six’ and its concomitant students’ demonstration which led to the formation 
of the Ghana College further widened the gap between Nkrumah and the rest of the working 
committee members. 
This development of antagonistic relationship of people whom their remarkable team work 
produced a synergy for nationalism prior to the riot sold a seed of session. Nkrumah might have 
nurtured the ambition of forming his own party as a result of the growing acrimonious relationship 
between him and the rest of the UGCC members. Eventually, he took advantage when the 
opportunity presented itself to break away from the UGCC. 
In addition, the post-1948 riot setting up of the Watson Commission probe into the causes 
of the 1948 Riot contributed to the breaking away of Nkrumah to form his CPP. In the first place, 
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the Watson Commission probe and its report established that Nkrumah had Communist affiliations 
and as a result had become imbued with a Communist ideology which only political expediency 
has blurred.258 There was found among Mr. Nkrumah's papers a document purporting to be the 
constitution of a secret organisation called" The Circle "; and members of this body were required 
to swear personal loyalty to Mr. Nkrumah with disquieting threats in the event of infidelity.259 The 
Committee report made the working committee members of the UGCC to be more suspicious of 
Nkrumah as a communist. Also, prior to the commission’s probe, when the ‘big six’ were being 
arrested, Nkrumah was arrested with an  unsigned Communist Party· card that he had been given 
in London.260  When the UGCC leaders later detected that Nkrumah used the word comrade, which 
was a popular word used by the communists, in some of his letters of correspondence to the outside 
world, it was concluded that comrade was synonymous to communism.261 Owing to the fact that 
the rest of the working committee members were anti-communist, the commission report further 
widened the gap between Nkrumah and the rest of UGCC leaders leading to the breaking away of 
Nkrumah to form his own party. Thus, the 1948 Riot became the fulcrum of brewing 
misunderstanding and mutual mistrust between Nkrumah and the rest of the working committee 
members. 
Added to the above, the 1948 Riot created a platform for Nkrumah to developed the feeling 
of betrayal by the working committee members of the UGCC leading to the breaking away of 
Nkrumah from the UGCC. When Nkrumah officially took office as the general secretary of the 
UGCC in January 1948, he was instructed to draw a programme for the UGCC so as to execute 
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the plans and the aims of the party. On 20th January 1948, Nkrumah presented the  programme 
which he draw to the working committee of the UGCC, and it was unanimously accepted in 
principle.262 Among the plan of action of the programme were the formation of a shadow 
government; consolidation of existing branches and formation of new ones; the convening of a 
Constitutional Assembly of the Gold Coast people to draw up the Constitution for Self-
Government or National Independence; and organised demonstration, boycott and strike as 
weapons to support the UGCC pressure for Self-government.263 
Surprisingly, the working committee members especially the rest of the five that were 
arrested with Nkrumah denied any knowledge of such programme before the Watson 
Commission.264  Nkrumah in his Autobiography expressed the feeling of betrayal in the following 
words: 
The most interesting thing was that, with the exception of one man, Mr. S. E. Ackah, every 
member of the Executive committee of the United Gold Coast Convention completely 
disowned the recommendations that I had put before them in connection with the 
organisation of the U.G.C.C. Several of them, upon being cross-examined, did admit that 
I had submitted these recommendations to the Executive but added that they had never 
associated themselves with it. The general idea that they were trying to put over was that I 
was merely an employee of the Convention and that as such they could not be entirely 
responsible for all my actions. And so, I was left holding the baby.265 
However, Nkrumah was vindicated by the Watson Commission. The Watson Commission 
Report  established that it was naive on the part of the working committee members to say they 
were not aware of the working programme of the UGCC drew by Nkrumah which was in 
circulation, and that at all material times, the political convictions of Nkrumah were known to 
 
262 ibid 71. 
263 The Autobiography of Nkrumah, p.72 
264 ibid 72. 
265 ibid 85. 
73 
 
them.266  The working committee members were disingenuous on this issue  for the sake of political 
expediency, they did not want to associate themselves with Nkrumah’s plan which was deemed as 
communist inclined by the colonial government. They wanted to maintain their political and 
personal reputation and image intact. This was at the time the Cold War was gaining grounds and 
they knew the political implications of being tagged with communist proclivities. On the contrary, 
the attempt by the working committee members to protect their image in the eyes of the British 
Colonial Office as anti-communist turned out to be an exercise in futility. In the colonial office 
response to the report of the Watson Commission sent to Clement Atlee, the prime minister, Creech 
Jones, the secretary of the state at the time, hinted that the Secretary of the UGCC had contacts 
with the Communist Party which was known to the other members of the UGCC executive.267 This 
by no means a measure dented their image as being influenced with communist persuasions. 
Meanwhile, the preposterous denial of having gotten nothing to do with Nkrumah’s programme 
and recommendations by the working committee members, and the perception Nkrumah had that 
he was being regarded as a mere employee of the UGCC rather than being an indispensable 
eminent member sparked-off the need to have his own party. This was one of the remote reasons 
that made Nkrumah to break away from the UGCC. 
Finally, Nkrumah’s exclusion from the Coussey Committee also played a decisive role in his 
breaking away from the UGCC. As I indicated earlier, the 1948 Riot led to the setting of the 
Watson Commission to probe the causes of the riot. The Commission recommended the 
promulgation of a new constitution for the Gold Coast. Consequently, the colonial government 
appointed a forty member all African committee headed by Justice Henley Coussey which later 
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became known as the Coussey Committee to draft a new constitution for Gold Coast.268  The forty- 
member committee included six working committee members of the UGCC: B.D. Addai, Edward 
Akuffo Addo, J.B. Danquah, G.A. Grant, Cobina Kessie, and E.O. Obetsibi Lamptey.269 
The general secretary of the UGCC, Nkrumah was conspicuously missing in the Coussey 
Committee. This was a matter of course. The colonial government would not risk to include him 
in a committee to draft a new constitution because of the Watson Commission Report which 
indicted him as someone who had Communist affiliations and had become imbued with a 
Communist ideology which only political expediency has blurred.270 The Cold War politics which 
had gathered momentum by 1949 definitely made Britain to tread cautiously in dealing with 
Nkrumah as a pro-communist nationalist, and it would have been politically suicidal on their part 
to include him in the committee. Also, the colonial government concluded that it was Nkrumah’s 
ability to exploit a situation, and not because of any faculty for constructive political thinking, that 
Mr. Nkrumah was most dangerous to the peaceful progress of Gold Coast.271 For these reasons, 
Nkrumah was not appointed to be a member of the Coussey Committee. 
His exclusion from the Coussey Committee meant that he had more time for the party 
business. While from May 1949 the six members of the working committee mentioned above were 
busy working to draft a new constitution, Nkrumah ceased the opportunity to cunningly work 
towards forming his own party. In a letter from the colonial government to Creech Jones, on the 
political developments in Gold Coast, the colonial administration at that time observed that: 
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Nkrumah’s most adroit moves has indeed been his unscrupulous use of facilities afforded 
by the Convention [the UGCC] party machine and of such of the party's tenets as are not 
incompatible with his own. In so doing, Mr. Nkrumah has been able not only to exploit to 
the full the "good will" and organisation of the Convention, but also to blur that party's 
never very precise programme to an extent which has caused great embarrassment to its 
more respectable members. As a result, he has diverted to his own projects a modest but 
comfortable income in donations from Convention supporters.272 
 
Nkrumah himself corroborated this stance of the colonial government about him when he let the 
cat out of the bag in his Autobiography: 
Ever since the first indication of the divergence of views between myself and the members 
of the UGCC during our detention together, I knew that sooner or later a final split would 
have to come. I was determined, therefore, to organize things in such a way that when this 
break came, I would have the full support of the masses behind me.273 
 
Nkrumah’s exclusion from the Coussey Committee provided him the utmost opportunity to 
execute his grand plan. Nkrumah's main energies were, indeed, directed towards the political 
education of youthful literates from the stage of upper elementary education onwards, and the 
various Youth Associations, clubs and study groups, formed by his Lieutenants or under his 
stimulus became the main organisations that supported him.274 It was this youth that Nkrumah later 
used to form the Committee for Youth Organisation (CYO) which was later metamorphosed into 
the CPP.275 Once again, Nkrumah formed the CYO at the blind side of the working committee 
members whom most of them were actively involved in the Coussey Committee’s work.276 The 
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action of Nkrumah at this time could be aptly describe as political opportunism at its best. He used 
the UGCC as a springboard to launch his own political movement, a blow and a shock which the 
UGCC never recovered. 
It is important to note that, the formation of CPP was very significant. It ended the political 
monopoly the UGCC would have enjoyed prior to independence, and paved way for multiparty 
pluralism in Ghana. The CPP was effectively organised to include the youth, the labour unions, 
and people from all walks of life. It won the 1951, 1954, and the 1956 elections and led Ghana to 
her independence. It is therefore not far fetched to say that the 1948 Riot led to the formation of 
the CPP which ultimately won independence for Ghana. 
4.3 How the 1948 Riot Brought a Radical Constitutional Change Which Gave Gold Coast a 
Self-Government 
The first significant impact the riot had on Gold Coast constitutional reforms leading to 
Ghana’s independence was that the riot changed Britain’s slow attitude in granting Gold Coast a 
radical constitution that would result in Gold Coast gaining self-government. Although the spirit 
of self-determination was the principle behind the declaration of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 at 
the time of the war, Britain was just not prepared to grant political independence to Gold Coast 
and most British colonies after the war. Weinstein Churchill, the prime minister of Britain after 
WW II emphatically declared that, “I did not become the Prime Minister of His Majesty's 
Government in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”277 This political 
mindset influenced British attitude towards Gold Coast after WW II. In fact, Gold Coast was seen 
by the British as a peaceful and well-behaved colony, which by logical extension would love to 
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remain under the British colonial rule.278 The British had an erroneous impression that Gold Coast 
preferred to be under the British colonial rule to having political independence. 
Even in the few years prior to the promulgation of the 1946 Constitution, Sir Alan Burns, 
the governor of Gold Coast under whose watch the 1946 constitution came into fruition had to 
convince the colonial office in London to accept the reforms the 1946 Constitution was bringing 
forth. The colonial office had a big reservation about a constitution that will give African unofficial 
majority in the central legislative assembly let alone a constitution that will give self-government: 
There is a strong case against unofficial majorities in the central Legislatures in West 
Africa. All our Colonial experience- and we have a good deal of it - is, to my mind, against 
the idea. It is not a question of opposing political progress: but of opposing a type of 
constitution which can in itself be thoroughly bad and the enemy of progress. Unofficial 
majorities in central Legislatures mean power without responsibility. They encourage the 
evolution of native politicians who can impede Government and play to the gallery in the 
safe assurance that they can never be called upon to form an alternative Government and 
that their obstructive tactics will not bring the administration to an end so long as they can 
force the Government to exercise its overriding powers. They encourage petty criticism at 
the expense of constructive ideas and are the worst form of educating native peoples in the 
management of their own affairs.279 
 
This position was vehemently supported by the secretary of state. He argued that, “it would not be 
wise to introduce an unofficial majority into the Gold Coast Legislature.”280 It was in the light of 
this development that Alan Burns had to employ every means possible to convince the colonial 
office to accept the African unofficial majority in the Legislative Council. He was of the view that, 
“it would be useless to attempt to formulate any alternative proposals for modifying the present 
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constitution unless the Secretary of State was prepared to concede an unofficial elected African 
majority for the Central Legislature.”281 
There was an intransigent and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the British to grant Gold 
Coast a constitution that would bring about self-government. Even a post-WW II constitution 
reforms that gave Gold Coast an unofficial majority in the Legislative Assembly was done with 
monstrous skepticism. However, the 1948 Riot changed the adamant posturing of Britain towards 
granting Gold Coast a radical constitution which would ensure self-government. The Watson 
Commission Report recommended a new constitution for Gold Coast. The Commission which was 
set up to probe into the causes of the riot and to make recommendation for reforms, concluded and 
recommended that, “We are satisfied that in the conditions existing to-day in the Gold Coast [after 
the riot] a substantial measure of constitutional reform is necessary to meet the legitimate 
aspirations of the indigenous population.”282 The commission described the much-touted 1946 
Constitution of Gold Coast as “outmoded at birth.”283 Nkrumah in his Autobiography contended 
that the implication of the Watson Commission recommendations was that there must be a new 
constitution for the Africans to taste political power.284 Consequently, the colonial government 
appointed all Africans Committee (the Coussey Committee) to draft a new constitution for Gold 
Coast. 
The colonial office admittedly remarked that, “The appointment of the Committee [the 
Coussey Committee] was a logical corollary of accepting, with qualifications, the report of the 
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Watson Commission.”285 Also, in summarizing the views of the colonial office departments in 
relation to the recommendations of the Watson Commission, the colonial office conceded that the 
1948 Riot gave it no option than to yield to a radical constitutional reform: 
The proposals regarding the Executive Council are much the most important. I am quite 
convinced that we must bring Africans on to the executive straight away. Probably it would 
have been better to start these off as Members wholly responsible to the Governor, but 
having regard to the course of events in the Gold Coast and to these published 
recommendations I doubt whether we can in fact resist the undoubted demand which there 
will be for African ministers. I believe that the proper course is to accept this 
recommendation [the Watson Commission constitutional reforms recommendations].286 
Undoubtedly, the 1948 Riot became the turning point of Ghana’s decolonisation drive. It 
precipitated the promulgation of a more radical constitution which granted Gold Coast an internal 
self-government, which has eluded the people of Gold Coast prior to the riot. The riot indeed 
compelled the British colonial administration to disabuse her mind of the notion that Gold Coast 
was content with the British colonial rule, and as a result it did not need a radical constitution to 
attain self-government. The riot abruptly ended the adamant and intransigent attitude of the British 
colonial office in giving Gold Coast a self-government-driven constitution. 
Finally, the 1948 Riot led to the promulgation of the 1951 Constitution which prepared 
Gold Coast political elites to take over political administration of Gold Coast. As indicated early 
on, the riot led to the setting up of the Watson Commission which recommended a more radical 
constitution, leading to the setting up of the Coussey Committee which drafted the 1951 
Constitution. The Watson Commission after a careful examination of the Gold Coast political 
 
285 CO 537/4635 9-29 June 1949 [Coussey Committee]: minutes byE G G Hanrott, L H Gorsuch, A B Cohen, Sir T 
Lloyd and Mr Creech Jones on the anticipated recommendations of the Committee, culled from BDEEP Series B 
Volume 1, Part 1, p. 141. 
286 CO 96/796/5, no 43 29 June 1948 [Watson Commission Report]: minute by A B Cohen summarising the views of 
the CO departments, culled from BDEEP Series B Volume 1, Part 1, p. 86. 
80 
 
situation recommended what ought to be done in terms of the road map to the self-government of 
Gold Coast: 
In so far as our proposals are acceptable, we recommend them as the basis of   
constitutional reform for a probationary period of ten years. At the end of that period the 
whole matter would be reviewed in the light of the experience gained. We do not believe 
that an atmosphere of stability would be created by any shorter period of trial.287 
Thus, the commission had no doubt Gold Coast needed a constitution that would guarantee self-
government, however, it believed a probationary period of ten years would prepare the educated 
elites to gain experience for the post-independent political administration of Gold Coast. The 
Colonial office did not depart from the principle of ensuring the Africans acquire rich political 
experience for a period before ultimately granting Gold Coast a political independence as 
recommended by the Watson Commission. The colonial administration in a dispatch to the 
secretary of states, Creech Jones, at the time the Coussey Committee had commenced its sitting 
intimated that, “it appears to confirm that we are right in pressing forward with our plans for gradual 
political advance on the three-fold line of local government reform, regionalization and African 
executive responsibility at the centre; and that this line is likely to strengthen the position of 
responsible Africans.”288 
This was in response to what the colonial administration called “emotional ferment, which 
Nkrumah is so adept at exploiting.”289  The emotional ferment of Nkrumah was in reference to 
Nkrumah with support of the teeming youth designated as Ghana Youth Group and Accra Students 
Union, which drafted a constitution on Christmas Day to be introduced effectively in Gold Coast 
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in 1949, and the date Nkrumah fixed for the achievement of self-government was 1st April after 
the original date in October 1948 did not materialize.290 The Colonial office was emphatic that it 
was in support of the colonial administration’s position to take the needed action  to dispel the 
impression created by almost daily articles in the local press to the effect that the report of the 
Coussey Committee would result in complete self-government within the current year[1949].291 
The Coussey Committee Report, made the following recommendation regarding the executive 
council: 
The Report recommends an Executive Council consisting of the Governor as Chairman; 
three ex-officio members; a Leader of the Legislative Assembly elected by the Assembly; 
and seven members drawn from the Assembly (five of whom would be Ministers with 
portfolio and two Ministers I without portfolio). These seven would be appointed by the 
Governor in consultation with the Leader and would be required to resign collectively on 
a vote of no confidence in the Leader by two-thirds of the Assembly. The Executive 
Council under the Committee's recommendation would be collectively responsible to the 
Legislative Assembly and not responsible -to the Governor, but the Governor would retain 
reserve powers.292 
Some slight changes were made to these recommendations by the colonial office. The Executive 
Council was made to continue to be advisory to the Governor, rather than responsible to the 
House of Assembly, for so long as the ultimate responsibility for the administration of the Colony 
rested with the Governor, and secondly, in the absence of a Party system, the colonial office did 
not regard it as practicable for the Leader of the House of Assembly to be elected by 
that House and it was proposed that the Leader should be selected by the Executive 
Council.293 The colonial office was also emphatic that the constitution would not provide full 
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self-government, but it gave some undertaking that the constitution would be reviewed after a 
specified period of years.294 
Nkrumah called the Coussey Committee Report on Constitutional reforms (the 1951 
Constitution) as ‘Trojan gift horse that was bogus and fraudulent’.295 He also described it as 
unsatisfactory. Subsequently, Nkrumah declared ‘positive action’, and the government responded 
by declaring state of emergency, arresting Nkrumah and some of the CPP leaders. Nkrumah was 
arrested on 21 January 1950 and subsequently sentenced, on three separate counts, to a total of 
three years imprisonment.296 Interestingly, the CPP won a landslide victory in the 1951 general 
elections, under the very constitution Nkrumah described as ‘fraudulent and bogus.’ On the 
grounds of political expediency, Nkrumah was released from prisons by the colonial 
administration. This was because the colonial office posited that, “Nkrumah should be released for 
broad reasons of policy, on the ground that, now that a democratic constitution is about to come 
into force in the Gold Coast, it is undesirable that the leader of the main political party should 
remain in prison, since it is on the co-operation of that party with Government that the successful 
working of the constitution will to a considerable extent depend.”297 
It is worthy to note that the declaration of the ‘positive action’ was inconsequential to the dictate 
and the implementation of the 1951 constitution. Upon the Nkrumah induced-strike, and boycott 
and labour unrest, the election came off as scheduled, and the provisions in the 1951 Constition 
was never amended. The so called ‘Self-Government Now’ mantra of the CPP was only a political 
gimmick that was used to woo the electorates. In effect, the road to political independence which 
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was set in motion by the 1948 Riot went on unabated. The declaration of the positive action only 
ensured the personal and political aggrandisement of Nkrumah to the detriment of maintaining law 
and order in Gold Coast. It also succeeded in portraying the members of the UGCC to the 
electorates as not in hurry to fight for the liberation of the people of Gold Coast. The positive 
action was a ‘political stratagem’ orchestrated by Nkrumah and the CPP to make them appear as 
the messiah needed to end imperialism in Gold Coast, when they know very well that the 
constitutional reforms triggered by the 1948 Riot could not be set aside. It came as no surprise 
when Nkrumah was later criticised by his own back benchers and members of his party outside 
the Legislature for his considerable share in the so far successful working of a constitution which 
previously, he had described as bogus and impossible.298 
As it was the aim and plan of the colonial government, and the spirit of the 1951 
Constitution to make the African nationalist to gain experience in political administration before 
independence, Nkrumah and seven others were appointed as ministers, but responsible to the 
governor. Nkrumah was appointed as Leader of Government Business (was later given the title 
prime minister in 1952), while   others like Casely Hayford, J.A. Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio, Hutton 
Mills, Ansah Koi, Asafo Agyei, and J.A. Braimah were appointed to be in charge of some 
ministries.299  In 1952, upon a request made by Nkrumah to the colonial office, some changes were 
made to the 1951 Constitution: 
( a) The title of Leader of Government Business should be changed to Prime Minister. (b) 
The Prime Minister would be chosen by the Governor in his discretion but submitted to the 
Legislature for its approval. (c) The Executive Council should have the alternative title of 
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the Cabinet. (d) The Prime Minister should rank, in Cabinet, next in order of precedence 
after the Governor (or Officer administering the Government) and would preside in Cabinet 
in his absence. (e) The Governor would act after consultation with the Prime Minister, not 
in his sole discretion, in nominating for the Legislature's approval the African Ministers 
and in assigning to them responsibility for Departments.300 
The rationale behind these changes from the colonial office perspective was to provide a chance 
of delaying further constitutional changes in order to allow time for the African Ministers to gain 
a further sense of responsibility and knowledge of government, and time perhaps for an opposition 
party to develop.301 These changes were made possible because of the British commitment to 
ensure periodic constitutional evolution of Gold Coast.302 It is obvious that the change of the 
colonial office mindset towards Gold Coast constitutional development due to the 1948 Riot was 
at play here. The aim was to ensure gradual constitutional reforms to enable the Africans gain rich 
experience in political governance before the ultimate political independence was granted. 
After the above changes in the 1951 Constitution, a new constitution came into force in 
1954. This was as a result of discussions between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Gold 
Coast Ministers on constitutional reforms, and proposals were formulated by the Gold Coast 
Government after consultation with the Chiefs and people of the Gold Coast.303 The proposals 
were examined and discussed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Gold 
Coast.304 Britain at this time was more than prepared to put in place a constitution for the full Self-
Government in Gold Coast.305 This was after Nkrumah on 10th July, 1953,  moved a motion on 
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constitutional reform,  independence motion, which became popularly known as ‘The Motion of 
Destiny’.306  The 1954 Constitution came into force, and election was conducted. Nkrumah-led 
CPP won massively and CPP government was formed.307 I must hasten to add that, the changes 
made to the 1951 Constitution, and the promulgation of the 1954 Constitution did not come about 
as a result of radical and violent nationalist agitations, such as strikes, boycott, and vandalism 
which sometimes result in jeopardizing life and properties, but it was a peaceful and meaningful 
engagement between the African leaders in government and the colonial office. This development 
was a corollary of the road map to Ghana’s independence adopted by the British after the 1948 
Riot. 
Ghana would have gained her independence immediately after the 1954 general elections 
had it not been the delay of the process as a result of the formation of the NLM. The process of 
Ghana’s independence was halted as a result of the unresolved differences between the NLM 
supported by some members of the opposition, and Nkrumah.  In his message to the Asanteman 
Council, conveyed in his telegram No.756 of the 31st December 1955, the Secretary of State 
informed them that failure on the part of the Gold Coast peoples to resolve harmoniously their 
differences of opinion must inevitably retard their progress towards self-government.308 The 
colonial office decided to have a compromise and ended up organizing another general election in 
1956. Nkrumah and his CPP won massively, and Ghana officially became independent on 6th 
March, 1957. 
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This chapter basically underscored the decisive role the 1948 Riot played as the turning 
point of Ghana’s decolonisation drive. The chapter discussed this theme under three thematic 
areas: the upsurge of political consciousness and the political temperature in Gold Coast, the 
breaking away of Nkrumah from the UGCC to form the CPP, and the 1948 Riot-induced radical 
constitutional reforms which led to the independence of Ghana. With regard to the upsurge of 
political consciousness and political temperature, the chapter examined the death, casualties and 
destruction of properties as a result of the riot which was unprecedented and helped to increase the 
political consciousness, and political temperature in Gold Coast. Again, political consciousness 
saw a massive upsurge due to the UGCC leaders making of political capital from the riot. They 
blamed the riot on the ineptitude of the government, and called for an all- African government to 
take over the administration of Gold Coast. Added to the above, this chapter threw light on the use 
of emergency powers and the arrest and detention of the UGCC leaders by the colonial 
administration as one of the ways the riot caused the upsurge of the political consciousness.  It also 
discussed how the Watson Commission Report brought to light the lukewarm attitude of the 
government in solving the problems faced by Gold Coast resulted in the upsurge of political 
consciousness. 
In discussing the how the riot led to the breakaway of Nkrumah from the UGCC, how the 
arrest and detention widened the gap between Nkrumah and the rest of the working committee 
members of the UGCC was expounded. Also, this chapter extensively explained that the Watson 
Commission establishing the fact that Nkrumah was a pro-communist due to his association with 
the communist party in Britain contributed to Nkrumah breaking away from the UGCC. More so, 
this chapter established that the 1948 Riot created a platform for Nkrumah to developed the feeling 
87 
 
of betrayal against the working committee members of the UGCC leading to the breaking away of 
Nkrumah from the UGCC. The chapter finally demonstrated that Nkrumah’s exclusion from the 
Coussey Committee precipitated his breaking away from the UGCC. Emphasis was equally laid 
on the fact that the formation of CPP provided Ghana a dynamic political party which won 
independence for Ghana. 
Added to the above, the chapter expounded how the riot changed British lackadaisical and 
lukewarm attitude towards the issue of Gold Coast self-government drive. Last but not least, this 
chapter examined thoroughly how the 1948 Riot led to the promulgation of radical constitutions 
















The period after WW II saw an upsurge in nationalism in Africa, Asia, and Indigenous 
nationalism in North America. This paper examined the peculiarity of Ghana’s post-WW II 
nationalism leading to her decolonization, and independence. The most historically conspicuous 
nationalist events that occurred after WW II were the formation of political parties, the nationwide 
boycott of European goods in 1948, the 1948 Riot, and the declaration of Positive Action by the 
Nkrumah-led CPP. Notable among the political parties that shaped the political discourse after 
WW II were the UGCC, the CPP, and the NLM. The UGCC was a merger of the leading educated 
elites in Gold Coast who realized the need to unite to wrestle political independence from the 
colonial government. The educated elites gave up on their personal and pre- WW II dormant 
nationalist organistions to form the UGCC to chart on a new path.309 However, the UGCC’S 
constitutional and the gradual approach towards the issue of independence did not appeal to the 
masses. Consequently, the UGCC could not win independence for Ghana. 
In a sharp contrast to the UGCC, the radical ideology of the CPP, the ‘independence now’ slogan 
coupled with the organizational abilities, and charismatic leadership of Nkrumah captivated the 
masses to vote massively for the CPP in all the elections.310 The activities of CPP brought it on a 
collision course with the colonial government. However, the CPP won independence for Ghana. 
The NLM expressed an Asante nationalism which was meant to safeguard Asante interest, and it 
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was clearly manifested in their drive to protect chieftaincy in the constitution of independent 
Ghana. The NLM vehemently opposed Nkrumah because they were apprehensive that Nkrumah 
would be an autocratic president in independent Ghana, hence their call for a federal constitution. 
The NLM failed because of its parochial political interest. These three political parties organised 
rallies, political campaign and participated in elections. The political parties took advantage of the 
political, economic and social conditions in Gold Coast after WW II to eventually win 
independence for Ghana. 
The Nii Kwabena Bonne III-led nationwide anti-inflationary campaign mustered all 
possible support in the colony (Gold Coast) from the chiefs, and the people to declare a boycott of 
European goods. The rationale behind the boycott was not political, but it was driven by a burning 
desire to end the economic exploitation of the people by the European firms.311 The boycott 
disabused the minds of the foreign trade community and the colonial government that the 
indigenous people of Gold Coast by reason of tribalization and mutual distrust, are unsuccessful 
to combine effectively for any single purpose.312 
The 1948 Riot was the mother of the post-WW II nationalism in Gold Coast. It was sparked-off 
by the government brutal reaction to the marching of the ex-servicemen, when the latter violated 
the prior approved routes for the march. The riot spread to most part of the colony amidst 
destruction of life and properties. The declaration of the Positive Action was in reaction to the 
perceived non-satisfactory approach by the colonial government on the matter of self-government 
of the 1948 Riot by the CPP. Nkrumah employed the weapons of legitimate political agitation, 
newspaper and educational campaigns and, as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, 
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boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute nonviolence, as used by Gandhi 
in India.313 The positive action resulted in loss of lives, political tension, the arrest and detention 
of some leaders of the CPP. 
The post-WW II nationalist activities in Gold Coast did not happen in a vacuum, they were 
promoted by economic, social and political factors that were connected to WW II. WW II, thus 
acted as a catalyst in promoting nationalist activities in the case of Gold Coast.  Socially, the lack 
of educational facilities in Gold Coast was one of the factors that promoted nationalism after WW 
II. The teeming youth had developed a keen interest in education and the lack of educational 
facilities frustrated them. There was a stimulation in demand for education due to the post- WW 
II economic boom in Gold Coast.  WW II-driven economic boom in terms of increase in the price 
of cocoa and other export commodities provided most people with the financial muscle to pay for 
quality education in Gold Coast.314 The government’s inability to provide the needed educational 
facilities became a stimulus of nationalism in the midst of increase in demand for education as a 
result of WW II- driven economic boom. Another social factor which promoted nationalism after 
WW II was the acute shortage of housing facilities in Gold Coast. The post- WW II acute housing 
shortage in the cities not only made the colonial government unpopular, but it also made the masses 
develop a revulsion against the political regime.315 The acute dearth of housing facilities was 
aggravated by racial consideration in the distribution of the few government facilities.316 The next 
WW II related social factor that influenced nationalism after the war was the ‘broken myth’ 
surrounding the white man’s superiority. African soldiers fought under the same conditions with 
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the white soldiers, and some like Seth Anthony, rose to officer rank and were put in the command 
of white men.317  The African soldiers experience in WW II shattered the prestige of the white man 
and the myth of his inherent superiority which had been the psychological barrier to radical 
nationalism prior to WW II. This explains the upsurge of nationalism on the part of the ex-
servicemen with boldness manifested in the 1948 Riot, the Positive Action, and political party 
activities prior to the independence of Ghana. Indeed, WW II acted as a vehicle for nationalism in 
Gold Coast. 
The most prominent post-WW II economic factor that promoted nationalism was the high 
rate of inflation of imported goods as a result of the shortage of imported goods and its inevitable 
economic hardship. The shortage of the imported goods was due to the devastating impact of WW 
II on the economies of Europe which drastically curtailed the production of goods.318  At the time, 
money incomes and wages also rose rapidly during the War years, due to such factors as Allied 
military expenditure and increased receipts for Gold Coast export.319 This WW II-driven price hike 
brought untold hardship to the people, hence their massive participation in nationalist activities 
such as the Nii Kwabena Bonne-led boycott of European goods, and the 1948 Riot, in which the 
participation was devoid of class, and social status. 
Furthermore, the swollen shoot disease which affected the cocoa industry from the 1930s 
to the 1940s and the unsatisfactory approach of the colonial government in salvaging the situation 
promoted nationalism after WW II. Cocoa has been the mainstay of the Gold Coast economy (63 
percent of its export value in the 1940s and the 50s was from cocoa), and the industry was solely 
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owned by the Africans.320 The colonial government policy of cutting out of the affected trees 
without proper education of the farmers, and their failure to pay a meaningful compensation to the 
affected farmers made the government unpopular. The government inordinate cutting out of the 
affected trees which was coupled with corruption and discrimination, and the wild rumour that the 
British deliberately wanted to destroy the Gold Coast cocoa industry before they leave Ghana 
incensed Ghanaians. In the midst of this indignation towards the government, the government was 
more interested in increasing food production and the production of vegetable oils, and 
consequently, the government overconcentrated on WW II-related issues and little was done to 
combat the disease.321 Most Although the cutting out of the affected trees was the most 
scientifically efficient way to deal with the swollen shoot disease, the farmers opposed the cutting 
out campaign because WW II brought astronomical increase in the price of cocoa, and the cutting 
out meant loss of huge revenue to the farmers.322 Thus, WW II made the government’s approach 
to the problem to be seen by the people as an ad hoc and inept knee-jerk reaction. This partly 
accounted for the wide spread nationalism in Gold Coast after WW II. 
Politically, the discontent of the educated elites against the 1946 Burns Constitution was 
one of the factors that promoted nationalism after WW II. Although the constitution provided for 
an African majority in the Legislative Assembly, it allocated more of the seats to the educated 
elites.323 The educated elites therefore saw the Burns Constitution as a constitution designed to 
give more powers to the chiefs, and it was therefore a deliberate attempt to stifle their political 
aspirations. In spite of the fact that 1946 Constitution was an improvement over the 1925 
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Constitution, the declaration of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 at the time of WW II, which espoused 
self-determination raised the hopes of the educated elites for a radical constitution which would 
guarantee self-government.324 Thus, WW II created a source of inspiration for the educated elites 
to ask for a more radical constitution for self-government, hence their active participation in radical 
nationalism such as the formation of political parties. 
Again, the WW II acted as a catalyst in promoting nationalism because the grievances of 
the ex-servicemen against the colonial government played a significant role in the radical 
nationalism in post-WW II Gold Coast. The 65 000 demobilised ex-servicemen lamented over the 
failure of the government to fulfil her promise of providing them jobs, giving them tax exception, 
insufficiency of disablement pension rate as against an ever rising high cost of living, and the 
failure on the part of the government to provide grants to men too old to enter government service 
and to men anxious to start their business on their own account as was done in the United 
Kingdom.325 These grievances propelled the ex-servicemen to engage in the 1948 Riot, political 
party activities, the Anti-inflation boycott of European goods, and the Positive Action. 
Had it not been the emergence of WW II, the above social, economic, and political factors 
would not have been created to serve as the driving force behind the militant nationalism in Ghana 
leading to the of Ghana independence. In effect, WW II metamorphosed nationalism which was 
in paralysis before 1945 into a militant and radical nationalism which eventually dismantle 
colonialism in Gold Coast. 
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The 1948 Riot was the turning point for Ghana’s decolonisation drive. It was the event that 
swiftly precipitated Ghana’s political independence. In the first place, the riot created an upsurge 
in the political consciousness and political temperature of Gold Coast. One of the ways the riot 
helped to create an upsurge in political consciousness was that the nationwide unprecedented loss 
of lives, casualties and destruction of properties.326 This situation made all and sundry aware of 
the political condition in Gold Coast, and how the colonial government was using the security 
agencies to brutally maintained law and order. Consequently, the people of Gold Coast became 
curious and more interested the political issues especially in political party activities after the riot, 
which indubitably hasten Gold Coast decolonization process. Furthermore, another way by which 
the riot increased political consciousness in Gold Coast was the fact that, the UGCC leaders seized 
the opportunity to make political capital from the riot.327 The UGCC engaged in activities to fish 
from the troubled political waters created by the riot in collaboration of the local newspapers in 
their bid to reap political advantage of the situation which helped to increase the political 
consciousness in Gold Coast. 
Added to the above, another way the riot increased the political temperature and the 
political consciousness in Gold Coast was the use of the emergency powers and the arrest and 
detention of the working committee members of the UGCC by the colonial government. The state 
of emergency made many people to follow issues on national politics as to when such measures 
would be suspended, and this increased the political consciousness in Gold Coast. Similarly, 
because no charges were proffered against the UGCC leaders who were arrested and detained, it 
certainly created an impression in the minds of the well- meaning people of Gold Coast that it was 
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a calculated attempt by the government to intimidate the leaders of the only political party that 
wanted to rescue the people from the shackles of colonialism, hence an upsurge in the political 
temperature. The upsurge of political temperature created an enabling atmosphere for the rapid 
decolonization process. More so, the arrest of the six leaders, and their movements to many parts 
of the country helped to spread the information and the news of the political happenings in Accra 
to most places in Gold Coast.328 
Finally, the work and activities of the Watson Commission contributed to the upsurge in 
the political consciousness of Gold Coast after the riot. The commission in the first place opened 
its door to people from all walks of life in Gold Coast in their bid to probe the causes of the riot 
which made many people aware of the political developments in Gold Coast.329  Again, the 
commission helped to unearth the colonial government’s inefficiencies and lackadaisical approach 
in solving the political, social and economic problems of the Gold Coast which made many people 
to be more interested in Gold Coast political affairs. The 1948 Riot became the turning point for 
Ghana’s decolonization as it provided the needed political consciousness, and unquenchable 
political temperature needed for self-government. The colonial office admitted after the 1948 Riot 
that in the Gold Coast, the political consciousness of the native has developed more rapidly than 
in the rest of British West Africa and political power lies nearer to the hands of African leaders.330 
The next significant way the 1948 Riot became the turning point of Ghana’s decolonization 
drive was that it led to the breaking away of Nkrumah from the UGCC to form his own political 
party, the CPP, the political party that won independence for Ghana. In the first place, the post-
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1948 Riot arrest and detention of the six working committee members of the UGCC widened the 
gap between Nkrumah on one side, and the rest of the members on the other side.331 The riot led 
to the formation of Ghana National College by Nkrumah which further strained the relationship 
between Nkrumah and the rest of the UGCC leaders.332 These developments partly accounted for 
the breaking away of Nkrumah from the UGCC. Another way the riot brought about the formation 
of the CPP was that the post-1948 riot setting up of the Watson Commission to probe the causes 
of the 1948 Riot contributed to the breaking away of Nkrumah to form his CPP. The Watson 
Commission probe and its report established that Nkrumah had Communist affiliations and as a 
result had become imbued with a Communist ideology which only political expediency has 
blurred.333 This situation made it difficult for the UGCC leaders who were anti-communist, and 
wanted to protect their image before the British to continue to work with Nkrumah in the global 
political context of the Cold War. Thus, the 1948 Riot became the fulcrum of brewing 
misunderstanding and mutual mistrust between Nkrumah and the rest of the working committee 
members. 
Added to the above, the 1948 Riot created a platform for Nkrumah to developed the feeling 
of betrayal by the working committee members of the UGCC leading to the breaking away of 
Nkrumah from the UGCC. The blatant denial of the programme of action Nkrumah drew for the 
UGCC by the rest of the working committee members before the Watson Commission made 
Nkrumah to feel betrayed, and hence partly accounted for his formation of the CPP.334 Finally, 
Nkrumah’s exclusion from the Coussey Committee which was established to draft a new 
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constitution for the Gold Coast led to the breaking away of Nkrumah from the UGCC to form the 
CPP. While the rest of the UGCC members were engrossed with drafting a new constitution, 
Nkrumah used that period and UGCC’s platform to lay the foundation of CPP by unilaterally 
forming the CYO, and a newspaper to his political advantage.335 The formation of the CPP, a bye-
product of the 1948 Riot, blessed Ghana with a well-organised, youth-driven and a dynamic 
political party which won independence for Ghana. 
The most prominent way the 1948 Riot served as a turning point in Ghana’s decolonization 
drive was that, the riot set in motion a blowing wind of a radical constitutional change which gave 
Gold Coast self-government. The first significant impact the riot had on Gold Coast constitutional 
reforms leading to Ghana’s independence was that the riot changed Britain’s slow attitude in 
granting Gold Coast a radical constitution that would result in Gold Coast gaining self-
government. Prior to the riot, the British were not prepared to promulgate a constitution that would 
grant Gold Coast self-government.336 The riot made it a matter of necessity for the Watson 
Commission to recommend a constitution that would meet the aspirations of the peopl, and ensure 
self-government for the people of Gold Coast.337 The colonial government admittedly established 
the fact that the setting up of the Coussey Committee for the drafting of the 1951 Constitution was 
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a corollary of the Watson Commission’s recommendations.338 The colonial office conceded that 
the 1948 Riot gave it no option than to yield to a radical constitutional reform.339 
Finally, the 1948 Riot led to the promulgation of the 1951 Constitution which prepared 
Gold Coast political elites to take over political administration of Gold Coast. The Watson 
Commission after a careful examination of the Gold Coast political situation recommended 
constitutional reform for a probationary period of ten years period to enable the African elites to 
gain experience in terms of the road map to the self-government of Gold Coast.340 The Colonial 
office did not depart from the principle of ensuring the Africans acquire rich political experience 
for a period before ultimately granting Gold Coast a political independence as recommended by 
the Watson Commission.341 In spite of the CPP-led positive action against the 1951 Constitution 
and self-government now, it did not change the plan for that reasonable probationary period to 
prepare Ghanaians for self-government after the riot.342 The CPP formed government with the 
governor, and Nkrumah was made leader of government business, after the 1951 election, and 
some CPP party officers were appointed as ministers. A new constitution was promulgated in 
1954, which became the basis for the 1954 and 1956 elections which ultimately led to Ghana’s 
independence on 6th March, 1957. The 1948 Riot influenced and hasten Ghana’s decolonization 
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drive. Without the riot, Ghana’s nationalist drive for a new radical constitution for self-government 
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